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2ABSTRACT
Public Enterprises in Korea: 
with special reference to their roles 
in economic development
by
Oon-Suck Han
This study attempts to examine the role played by the 
public enterprise sector in Korea's economic development 
since the early 1960s, on which relatively little 
research has been directed. It is based on a belief that 
Korea's economic experience, particularly that of the 
1960s and 1970s cannot be explained without acknowledging 
the government's strong initiative in the economy.
The study discusses the rationale of public 
intervention in general, followed by a consideration of 
Korea's turbulent modern history, through which the 
dominant role of the public sector has emerged. It notes 
some strong socio-cultural aspects, such as racial 
homogeneity and the influence of neo-Confucianism as 
factors behind Korea's pattern of economic development.
3The study examines economic policy-making under the 
Park Government (1961-79) during which national planning 
and public enterprises were intensively utilized. A 
central part of the study consists of an examination of 
the role played by public enterprises during the 
country's rapid growth period of the 1960s and 1970s. The 
study found that public enterprises, as providers of 
infrastructure and pioneers in technology-intensive 
fields, provided the industrial base and inputs for the 
manufacturing sector. The study also found that the 
public financial sector gave the government a powerful 
means of control over the private sector.
The study also examines the unprecedented reform in 
the direction of Government-Invested Enterprises, the 
core group of the public enterprise sector, introduced as 
part of the economic liberalization measures in 1984. The 
study concludes that although there are some undesirable 
side-effects such as excessive competition and technical 
loopholes in the evaluation system, the overall reform 
deserves a positive interim assessment.
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8CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
One of the most distinctive features of the post-War 
era has been the growth in importance of public 
enterprises (PEs) in the structure of the national
economy. It is clear that PEs are growing in size and in 
the scope of their activities. In the early days it was
usual to find PEs in the public utilities and in the
basic infrastructure of the economy. But today we can 
find them in virtually every field of economic activity 
quite independent of the country's position in the
ideological spectrum.1 They have been the main sources of 
growth in many countries, particularly those newly 
independent and in which a robust private sector did not 
exist.
In many countries, colonialism itself was highly 
interventionist and laid the foundation for the PE 
sector. It was thus a simple step further for the newly 
independent government to extend the realm of the state 
to various industrial sectors both through the 
acquisition of previously colonialist-owned concerns and 
through investments in the newly created PEs. More 
importantly, far from being laissez-faire, people viewed 
the government as the most important agent of change and
9economic development.2
In developing countries,3 it is the PE which has to 
lay the basis upon which the structure of a dynamic and 
diversified economy is to arise by providing social 
infrastructures such as power, transport, irrigation 
facilities, etc. In the words of Hanson, 'Whatever the 
ultimate perspective may be, the country anxious to 
develop economically has no alternative but to use PE on 
a considerable scale, at the very least in order to get 
things going./4
Besides, PEs are often expected to pursue certain 
social objectives as diverse as redistributing income, 
subsidizing particular regions of a country, and creating 
or maintaining employment. By and large, PEs have made a 
positive contribution to the process of creating and 
developing basic infrastructure, lumpy industrial 
projects and human capital. Unfortunately, however, the 
economic growth and fulfilment of social objectives are 
in many cases not achieved in a cost-effective way. 
Governments of different political persuasions around the 
world are increasingly dissatisfied with their 
performance. Much of the dissatisfaction derives from the 
observation that PEs have shown limited dynamism in 
responding to market challenges. Too often, PEs have 
accumulated financial losses or achieved modest rates of 
return on invested capital. Equally alarming, the
10
unsatisfactory financial performance has often been 
transmitted to the rest of the economy.5
There are two possible sets of explanations for this 
dissatisfaction which clearly overlap. The first consists 
of country-specific characteristics and accounts for 
differences in performance of PEs from country to 
country. These characteristics include cultural, social, 
political, macroeconomic, and institutional factors. The 
second set includes factors that are specific to 
particular companies and accounts for variations in 
performance of PEs within a country. The study, however, 
directs to the first explanation.
The poor records of many PEs have prompted greater 
public awareness of PE management on the one hand and 
campaigns for privatization on the other. Firstly, there 
is an increasing realization that the nature of the 
problems faced in PE management tend to be different from 
those facing the private sector. Indeed, it would be 
over-simplistic to assume that systems of management 
which have been developed and practised by private 
enterprises can automatically be transposed to the area 
of PE management. However, one of the areas of PE study 
which so far have been paid insufficient attention is 
their environment. The environment is the social context 
in which PEs are embedded, the surrounding factors and 
forces that affect PE operations, and consists of a
11
number of different dimensions - e.g. political, 
economic, cultural, etc. The environment factor is more 
important in developing countries, where the persistent 
tendency of government to use PEs as conduits for giving 
political patronage has been a major cause of losses and 
of inefficiency.
Secondly, privatization has recently become a common 
feature in PE reform programmes in developing countries, 
for a number of reasons. One is the upsurge in interest 
in privatization in the developed countries, most notably 
in Britain. A second reason is a sense that the state 
sector has become too large and that privatization can 
reduce the management burden of PEs on the government. A 
third reason is the hope that privatization will lead to 
more innovative management which will generally use 
resources more efficiently. Yet, despite this widespread 
interest, substantial sales of assets or equity in PEs 
have occurred in only a few developing countries so far 
(notably Chile and Bangladesh) . Moreover, the enterprises 
privatized have usually been small in terms of assets or 
employment.6 The problems of privatization have proved 
fairly formidable. For PEs that operated at a loss, the 
government has found it hard to interest buyers; for 
those operating at a profit, it has been difficult to 
persuade managers and politicians to carry through the 
proposed sale; and for most PEs, profitable or otherwise,
12
the resistance of labour unions and parties on the left 
has proved substantial.
For the present, in spite of all the criticisms 
levelled at PEs in recent years because of their poor 
performance and the consequent campaigns for 
privatization, they continue to be major channels of 
development efforts in developing countries. Indeed, it 
is naive to assume that all the problems with PEs will 
disappear simply by handing them over to the private 
sector. According to a study on the UK experience, there 
is little evidence to support the simple assertion that 
change in ownership necessarily changes enterprise 
performance. Based on empirical evidence from ten UK 
organizations which had undergone a change in status in 
the last twenty years, Dunsire concluded:
Perhaps few would hold that a measure like 
privatization by itself affects performance. The 
operative mechanisms usually posited are:
(a) the policing role of the capital market; and/or
(b) an increase in competition; and/or (c) a change 
in managerial incentives. It is commonly
appreciated, too, that the latter two mechanisms
may be installed without a change in ownership, and 
that change in ownership does not necessarily 
entail them.
Certainly, neither investigation supports the 
simple assertion that change in ownership
necessarily changes enterprise performance, even in 
its sophisticated form, where capital market change 
is assumed to be accompanied by increased
competition and improved managerial incentives. 
Sometimes it does, sometimes it doesn't.7
After all, in developing countries, the real choice 
is between an imperfect public sector and an imperfect
13
private sector. Therefore, it is essential to search for 
ways to make the public sector less imperfect and the 
nature of PE may be better explored by looking critically 
at some of its actual uses. This dissertation, therefore, 
tries to provide an useful case study by exploring the PE 
sector in the Republic of Korea (hereinafter called 
'Korea' or 'South Korea') in conjunction with its social 
and political environment and their actual contribution 
during the country's critical period of economic 
development.
Korea's economic performance during the last three 
decades has been hailed as one of the outstanding success 
stories of economic development and regarded as one of a 
few generally accepted examples of successful national 
development.8 From a nation plagued by long-time colonial 
rule (1910-45) followed by the Korean War (1950-3) and 
the heavy defence burden subsequently carried, Korea has 
made rapid economic growth since 1961, when an army 
general, Park Chung Hee, took power by a military coup.9 
Given the low level of capital formation in the private 
sector, the government embarked upon a major economic 
development programme, in which public undertakings were 
intensively utilised in achieving growth and exercising 
leverage throughout the economy.
The economic status of Korea before 1961 was that of 
a typical underdeveloped country.10 The average growth
14
rate of the gross national product (GNP) during the 
period from 1954 to 1960 following the Korean War (1950- 
3) was 4.6 percent. With a population growth rate of over 
2.9 percent per annum, a substantial improvement of 
national income was viewed as a dream.11 Its small 
mountainous territory, of which only a little more than 
a fifth is arable, and its large population made Korea 
one of the most densely populated countries in the world, 
254 persons per square kilometre in 1961 (423 persons in 
1989) .
In terms of the endowment of production factors, the 
country is poorly equipped with natural resources. 
Domestic capital was not sufficient to support a 
substantial increase in investment for new industrial 
projects or the expansion of production facilities. The 
only advantageous factor of production was an abundant 
labour force whose level of education was relatively 
high.12
The growth trend changed abruptly, however, with the 
beginning of the First Five-Year Economic Development 
Plan (FFYP) in 1962. Thereafter, Korea's climb up the 
ladder of development accelerated.13 The country 
continued its rapid growth despite the two oil crises; 
during the 1961-78 period, the real GNP increased at an 
average annual rate of 8 percent and per capita income 
more than tripled in real terms. The two decades of the
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1960s and 1970s witnessed such sweeping social and 
economic changes as few generations in any society have 
ever experienced. It was in this period that Korea's 
economic 'take-off'14 was launched and the Korean economy 
underwent a deep transformation in its profile, changing 
from an essentially rural economy15 to a Newly 
Industrialized Country (NIC) .16 Thus, the two-decade 
period was critical in the evolution of the Korean 
economy and the main economic policy measures established 
in this period decisively marked the pattern of the 
country's later development.
How influential has the government been in Korea's 
development? Some argue that the government's main 
contribution has been the creation of a favourable 
economic environment for private enterprise. Thus, 
according to their view, the unprecedented rapid economic 
growth that Korea has experienced over the past three 
decades has been accomplished predominantly without the 
government's help.17 Nonetheless, it would be fair to say 
that the government played a key role in rapid industrial 
development through, among other things, effective 
planning18 and PEs have come to occupy a very vital role 
in the planned development pattern. Although the 
government has not always been in a position to dictate 
policies to the private sector, it has exerted extensive 
influence on business activities through its
16
administrative power and considerable PE sector.
This work is divided into six chapters. Following the 
introduction, chapter 2 examines some preliminary issues 
to do with PE. Chapter 3 provides a summary economic 
history of Korea in general and the PE sector in 
particular since the turn of the century. Lack of data on 
PE precludes any consistent picture of its history, but 
the target is to organize the existing material in order 
to throw light on the evolution of the sector in the 
context of the prevailing environment.
Chapter 4 deals with the analysis of the PE sector's 
contribution to economic development during the 1960s and 
1970s which corresponds to the period of the Park 
government. Since the 1980s the political and economic 
environment has changed rapidly and the government can no 
longer dictate the economy as much as it did before. In 
compliance with this change, the government gave up its 
ever-increasing grip on PEs and initiated in 1984 an 
important reform in the system of control and 
accountability of the Government-Invested Enterprises 
(GIEs), the core group of the PE sector. Chapter 5 deals 
with the reform measures and attempts a preliminary 
assessment. Chapter 6 is a summary and conclusion.
Two Cultural Heritages
17
In order to be able to understand the economic and 
political aspects of Korea, it will be useful to look at 
the cultural heritages over which highly centralized 
governments and a constructive public sector have 
emerged. The long historical continuity, during which 
Korean cultural and social patterns became firmly fixed, 
has left two unique heritages to the country. One is a 
high degree of cultural homogeneity as it became a nation 
of one race, one language, one culture. This homogeneity 
of the people is a significant factor in an evaluation of 
political and social problems. Whatever disunity or 
diversity appears in Korea is not a product of 
fundamental differences in race or culture within the 
community, but a consequence of less substantial 
causes.19
Indeed, of all the nations on the continent of Asia, 
Korea is the most culturally homogeneous. There is a 
continuity of a shared ethos and ethnic and linguistic 
identity that has been historically critical to Korea's 
survival as a separate culture. It has also given Korea 
a comparative advantage in development, because there 
were no significant minorities that had to be integrated 
into the society and no minority languages that acted as 
a brake on national education. As an essentially secular 
society, there was no strong traditional religious elite 
that could attempt to stem social or economic change, and
no major religioethnic nationalism that impeded national 
growth. No other nation on the continent of Asia, and 
only Japan among the insular nations, has been in this 
position. The effects of relative homogeneity on
development cannot be quantified, but they may be 
cons ider able.20
The other heritage is Confucianism, which was
introduced into Korea as an instrument of learning and
statesmanship during the Three Kingdom period (57 B.C.- 
A.D. 935) and since then greatly influenced the country's 
national life and culture. Unlike cultural homogeneity, 
however, the role of Confucian culture in Korean 
tradition with respect to developmental values is not 
clear. Confucianism has generally been regarded as 
backward, rather than forward, looking. Its emphasis on 
traditional learning, was said to undercut the acceptance 
of a more technologically oriented education.
Confucianism seemed to regard entrepreneurship and 
commerce as low on the scale of accepted occupations. 
Thus, it was argued, Confucianism retarded the sense of 
social cohesion beyond strictly parochial interests and 
had an uneconomic focus.21 Nonetheless, the Confucian 
philosophy is still pervasive and has great influence on 
the moral qualities of loyalty to the nation and filial 
piety.
The Confucian ethical system was adopted officially
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during the early days of the Yi dynasty (1392-1910) and 
replaced Buddhism, which had become corrupt. As 
government posts were distributed to Confucian scholars 
through civil service examinations, many Confucian 
institutions of learning were set up, and Korean scholars 
even made original contributions to the theoretical 
refinement of Confucianism in the 15th century.22
Deuchler points out a more significant role played by
Confucianism during this period:
But more important was the new and comprehensive 
dimension added to Korea's sociopolitical thought - 
rather than being a mere vehicle to state office, 
neo-Confucianism was taken as the universalistic 
basis upon which the state itself rested.... Neo- 
Confucianism served a pragmatic purpose. It 
provided a key to a new understanding of the 
classical Confucian literature that in turn 
furnished the details for sociopolitical order and 
stability. In contrast to earlier Confucian studies 
that had been stifled by orthodoxy and intellectual 
pettiness, neo-Confucianism had relevance to the 
contemporary situation and inspired confidence in 
the workability of its precepts.23
In Confucian society, the family stands in the centre 
and serves as a bridge between the state and the 
individual. Therefore, the family is not only the primary 
social group but also the prototype for all social 
organization. The individual achieves inner stature as 
well as social status through participation in and 
contribution to society, and the family offers the 
earliest and most favourable opportunity for this life­
long course of development. The properly cultivated 
individual is prepared for regulating the family, then
20
governing the state, and, finally, bringing peace to the 
world.24
One of the outstanding characteristics of Confucian 
social thought is the emphasis placed on the obligations 
rather than the rights and prerogatives of the individual 
in relation to society. And the one basic social 
obligation common to all is the cultivation of character. 
Education in general, therefore, is highly valued in 
Confucian traditions and had been virtually the only 
route to success and upward social mobility for centuries 
during both the Yi dynasty and Japanese rule.25
The implicit values in Confucian politics are those 
of harmony, stability, and hierarchy based on absolute 
authority in a well-ordered social structure. Social 
harmony had to be achieved through the reconciling of 
differences in an organic unity, and thus, a well- 
organized bureaucracy was the harmonious unity in which 
people of differing talents and professions remained in 
their proper classes, performed their proper functions 
and were all equally satisfied and not in conflict with 
each other. The politics of Confucian harmony aimed at 
political stability through the governance of changeless 
ruling elites and not through the conflicting balance and 
the struggle of divergent forces in a society.26
Thus the doctrines of Confucianism advocated a 
centralized benevolent form of monarchy as the only
21
legitimate form of moral government and emphasized the 
absolute subordination of the individual to government 
authority, official doctrines and centralized rule. 
Korean political culture, by and large, has been moulded 
by historic residues of the Confucian heritage that 
disposed most Koreans to a submissive authoritarian 
psychology. This tended to legitimize the moral authority 
of the upper strata and contributed to the establishment 
of interventionist governments.
22
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CHAPTER II 
THE RATIONALE OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISE
1. Definition
'Public enterprise denotes an organization operating 
on commercial principles, wholly or partly owned and 
effectively controlled by a public authority.'1
Public enterprises are very varied in their forms and 
activities, but they have two dimensions in common: they 
are government owned and controlled (public); and they 
are engaged in business activities (enterprise). PE, 
therefore, is a type of business organization, and its 
basic activities are similar to those of any other firm. 
But because it is publicly owned and controlled, its 
management will usually be accountable to some part of 
the governmental apparatus and so is open to direct 
political influence, while there is also the strong 
presumption that the enterprise should be operated in the 
general public interest,2 rather than have as its main 
objective the maximization of profit.
According to conventional economic theory, the aim of 
a private enterprise, on the other hand, is the 
maximization of the return on the capital employed, and 
social goals such as income distribution should be
removed from it. This traditional presumption, however, 
is highly questionable. There are today few managements 
of enterprises of any importance who would feel 
themselves free to pursue that aim without regard to 
numerous considerations of general social and political 
significance, such as the effect of their decisions on 
the environment, on employment, and on the national 
balance of payments. In addition, the divorce between 
ownership and control of major private enterprises can, 
as Galbraith has argued, make the continuation, growth 
and autonomy of the enterprise appear to the management 
as more important than mere profitability. It would, 
therefore, be unwise to assume that PE will automatically 
and invariably observe a greater regard for the public 
interest than private enterprise.3
Ideally, the characteristics of 'public' and 
'enterprise' dimensions should make a precise definition 
which is satisfactory both conceptually and 
operationally. In practice, this is difficult to do.
A. Issues on the Public Dimension
In some studies of the topic, 'public' means the 
state's possession of the controlling equity share - 
either directly or indirectly, usually defined as 50 
percent or more of the voting shares. This has been 
operationalised in some countries.4 There is a
27
statistical convenience in such a step. But what is the 
position from the conceptual angle? Although historically 
government ownership was an essential part of public 
undertaking in the early days, the essential significance 
of ownership lies in its being a window for control. 
Ownership does not always mean control and state control 
may be exercised with less than 50 percent of the voting 
shares, since most of the shares are widely dispersed. 
What is of importance is the role the government seeks to 
play in the entrepreneurial and major decision-making. It 
is, therefore, suggested that 'public' should be defined 
in terms of who controls the organization. If the 
decision-making power rests with the government, the 
enterprise should be defined as a PE.5
Indeed, when the European Community issued its 
directive on the financial relations between member 
states and public undertakings, it offered a definition 
of a 'public undertaking' which may be taken to be 
synonymous. The directive states that a public 
undertaking is one 'over which the public authorities may 
exercise directly or indirectly a dominant influence by 
virtue of their ownership of it, their financial 
participation therein, or the rules which govern it.' The 
'public authorities' are defined in turn as 'the state 
and regional or local authorities.'6
Government control, however, does not mean that the
28
state must be involved in the day-to-day operations of 
the enterprise, concerning itself with such decisions as 
hiring the labour force, choice of production techniques, 
or marketing. It means rather that the government has the 
ability or the potential to exercise control over the 
broad policies followed by the enterprise, and to appoint 
and remove the head of firm.7
B. Issues on the Enterprise Dimension
PEs produce goods and services for sale, which 
distinguishes a PE from a public activity in such fields 
as defence, police, education, public health, sanitation 
and the protection of the environment. In non-enterprise 
public activities the availability of an output to a 
client is not strictly governed by his ability to pay 
towards the cost of the supply to him. Nevertheless, it 
is difficult to be precise on what constitutes the core 
of an enterprise. Two inter-related ideas suggest 
themselves; financial viability and the cost-price 
relationship.
Financial viability means a conscious effort on the 
part of the enterprise towards raising a net revenue. 
This feature has to be spelt out as viability by 
intention and in the long run because an enterprise may 
experience occasional deviations from viability. For 
instance, there may be little viability during its
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gestation period; it does not achieve viability during 
periods of bad business; and its viability nay be 
disrupted under conditions of managerial inefficiency. 
But the intention is viability in the long run; or else 
it is not an enterprise and may be deemed as a non­
enterprise activity of a governmental agency.8
A non-enterprise activity may not be in that position 
for all time. As public thinking changes as regards the 
financial rationale of its operations and slides towards 
viability, its identity alters into that of an 
enterprise. For instance, warehousing, rural 
electrification and industrial estates may start as non­
enterprise activities; but as the conditions of demand 
improve and the social justifications for output and 
price policies weaken, the activities may tilt towards 
financial viability.9
The enterprise concept goes beyond financial 
viability, and is concerned with the way in which the 
viability is achieved. It is realised from the sales 
activity, and significance attaches to the relationship 
that prices bear to costs. The enterprise does not 
operate at a uniform fee, like a park authority. It does 
not levy a charge in relation to the clients' income or 
seek income through contributions. As an enterprise it 
goes by cost considerations in determining the payments 
that customers are to make.
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Difficulties exist in operationalising the cost-price 
relationship because it does not say much about the cost- 
price basis of enterprise operations. It makes an 
activity an enterprise if it earns well; and makes it a 
non-enterprise if it earns poorly. What proportion of the 
cost it earns through sales is a function not only of 
efficiency and business conditions but of the public 
decision interventions, which may cause a serious 
reduction in net revenues. This by itself does not 
deflect the enterprise from its enterprise character.10
Analogous to the cost-price criterion is the 
'marketedness' criterion proposed by Jones. He 
operationalised it in terms of the proportion that sales 
revenues constitute out of costs, namely, 'more than 
half'.11 Ramanadham pointed out that this idea does not 
take into account a situation in which a low proportion 
of sales revenue to costs is the result of enterprise 
inefficiency or poor business conditions.12 However, as 
it renders a clear criterion in the great majority of 
cases, Jones's definition is widely accepted in Korea. 
Based on Jones's definition, Sakong defined PE as:
A productive entity/organization which is owned 
and/or controlled by public authorities and whose 
output is marketed, where;
a 'productive entity/organization' is defined as an 
identifiable decision-making unit with an explicit 
or extractable budget, and which produces goods 
and/or services;
'ownership' indicates more than 50 percent of 
outstanding equity being held by a public 
authority, either directly by the government or
indirectly by public entities (including other 
public enterprises);
'control' means the power to be involved in the 
management of the enterprise through the 
appointment of top management (i.e., members of the 
board of directors and/or chief executive); and 
output is considered to be 'marketed' if sales 
cover more than 50 percent of current costs.13
2. Classification
Recognising that PEs are embodied in various 
organizational shapes it would be useful to examine these 
shapes and forms. Some argue that the shapes and forms 
are not important to a true understanding of PE activity. 
They say there is rarely any close correspondence between 
form and performance, which, according to them, depends 
on the efficiency of internal organization and 
procedures, and willingness of the political authorities 
to ensure commercial flexibility.14 Nevertheless, the 
external embodiments, shapes and forms have an enormous 
influence on the style of management and on the 
relationships which the PE has with the environment and 
with the controlling authorities.
Praxy Fernandes suggested four possible angles from 
which one could view the classification of PEs: the
intent and purpose of the organization; its legal and 
constitutional framework; its structure and organization; 
and the area of economic activity in which the enterprise 
operates.15 The most commonly accepted way of
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classification, however, is the second one and according 
to this, there are three main legal forms that may be 
taken by a PE.
A. The Departmental Undertaking
Before World War I there was a widespread assumption 
in Western Europe that a PE could be fitted into the 
normal departmental structure of the executive 
government. The Post Office, in fact, provided the 
prototype. The justification for this assumption was that 
in those days governments rarely entered into the more 
competitive or technologically experimental types of 
business where entrepreneurial abilities were required 
for management. The postal and communications services 
that, in most countries, constituted the bulk of the 
government's business responsibilities were monopolies or 
quasi-monopolies engaged in supplying standardized 
services at fixed prices.16
A considerable part of PE activities is still being 
executed as departmental undertakings. They have all the 
characteristics of PEs involving capital investment, the 
production and sale of goods or services, and an 
accounting system. But they are not established as 
independent legal entities. They are run as government 
departments. Consequently, they are subject to the 
general rules and regulations applicable to other
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administrative branches of the government. Their 
employees are civil servants and their budgets are part 
of the national budget. In Korea they are operated 
through 'special accounts7 of the central government 
budget.
B. The Public Corporation
One of the major institutional innovations is the 
public corporation, which was pioneered in Victoria, 
Australia, and is the form given to most of the British 
nationalised industries.17 A public corporation is a 
public trading body which has a substantial degree of 
financial independence from the public authority which 
created it and has two main characteristics. Firstly, it 
is publicly controlled to the extent that government 
appoints, directly or indirectly, the whole or the 
majority of the board of management. Secondly, it is a 
corporate body free to manage its affairs without 
detailed control by government; in particular, its 
financial independence includes the power to borrow, and 
to maintain its own reserves.18
The theory of the public corporation finds its 
earliest expression in one of W.F. Willoughby's articles, 
published in 1917. Inspired by the success of British and 
American colonial policies which were based upon the idea 
of delegating substantial administrative and financial
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autonomies to their respective colonial territories, 
Willoughby recommended this form of organisation for the 
operation of PEs to relieve the national government and 
Congress to a considerable extent of the ever increasing 
scope and variety of functions that were being imposed 
upon them.19 Herbert Morrison, who was mainly responsible 
for the popularisation of the public corporation concept, 
emphasised the commercial aspects of a board's 
responsibility. He argued that the commercial activities 
of government required more autonomy than that provided 
by the departmental form. Morrison's concept is 
traditionally associated with an 'arm's length' 
relationship of corporation and government. Government 
was seen as performing comparatively limited 
interventionist functions in the national interest. It 
was assumed that the board's policies would embody the 
public interest and that conflict with government on the 
interpretation of national interest would be very 
exceptional.20
Owned by the government, the public corporation is 
normally created by a special law defining its powers, 
prescribing its form of management, and specifying its 
relationships with superior governmental authorities. 
Although financed by treasury appropriations or loans, it 
meets its current costs from the sale of its goods and 
services, making normal commercial provision for
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depreciation and reserves. Its budget is separate from 
the government budget, and it is exempt from the normal 
regulations applicable to the expenditure of public 
funds. Governmental powers over the public corporation 
are usually limited to those assigned by its constituting 
statute. These, however, may be widely or narrowly 
defined, and in any case the relevant minister, being 
responsible for the nomination of the corporation's top- 
level management, can sometimes exercise an informal 
influence over its decisions that considerably exceeds 
the scope of his formal powers.
The essence of the concept of the public corporation 
is that it is not accountable to a minister for its day- 
to-day operations and therefore not answerable to 
parliament in detail for those operations, nor is it 
directly accountable to the electorate. The nature of the 
public corporation is well expressed by President 
Roosevelt. When recommending the formation of the 
Tennessee Valley Authority to Congress in 193 3 he 
referred to 'a corporation clothed with the powers of 
government but possessed of the flexibility of a private 
enterprise' ,21
Nonetheless, it is now frequently pointed out that 
the so-called arm's length relationship is hard to 
achieve in practice. The arguments in favour of the arm's 
length approach centre on the assumption that, if
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management could be permitted more freedom to make 
decisions and to implement them without excessive 
constraints from government, the performance of public 
corporation would be significantly improved. Also, boards 
would be more clearly accountable for their actions 
provided that relevant criteria could be agreed and that 
there was some mechanism for reassuring parliament and 
government that the underlying performance was 
satisfactory. Based on the experience of the British 
nationalized industries, the National Economic 
Development Office (NEDO) reported that the industries' 
importance as employers, suppliers and customers, and the 
economic and social implications of their actions make it 
right as well as inevitable that government should take 
a close interest in their strategies. It concluded that 
the public policies involved are so important and 
politically sensitive that it is not realistic to suppose 
that the nationalized industries could ever be left alone 
for long for their own management to determine, subject 
only to periodic checks by the government on their 
financial performance.22
The question is how best to construct a relationship 
with a public corporation in which the responsibilities 
and objectives of both the government and the public 
corporation are well defined and well understood. 
Whatever system is adopted it should be appropriate
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within the culture of the country concerned and its 
institutions, and appropriate also to the underlying 
purposes for which each public corporation exists.
C . The Company
An alternative to the public corporation is the state 
company. When this is used, the law relating to ordinary 
joint-stock companies is applied to the enterprise, and 
public control is ensured by the government's exercise of 
shareholding rights. Originally the state company device 
was developed in the European countries, but it is now 
widely employed throughout the world. The public 
corporation form is frequently used for utilities, while 
the state company form is favoured when the government 
enters the field of manufacturing industry.23
This form confers on the PE concerned a greater 
degree of commercial flexibility and more opportunities 
for private equity participation. The creation of a 
company may be effected by executive decree; often, it 
owes its existence to a development corporation, which is 
authorized to found subsidiaries organized on the joint- 
stock principle.
Classification of the Korean PE Sector
Broadly speaking, PEs in Korea have taken the three 
main forms discussed above. Besides this, the sector is
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conventionally classified into the following five 
categories according to the varying degrees of government 
participation in ownership and its intervention in 
management.
A. Government Enterprises; composed of various 
governmental departments such as the Office of Monopoly 
(until 1987) or Office of Railways. They are part of the 
government itself. Consequently, they are subject to the 
general rules and regulations applicable to other 
administrative branches of the government. They are 
operated through 'special accounts' of the governmental 
budget.
B. Government-Invested Enterprises (GIEs) ; enterprises in 
which the government's equity share is more than 50
percent of the total paid-in capital (i.e., Korea 
Electric Power Corporation) ,24 The government can 
designate a GIE while holding less than a 50 percent
share (i.e., General Chemical Company). Even in this
case, the government is still a majority shareholder
through both direct and indirect investments. Almost all 
of the GIEs are established by foundation laws and all of 
them are autonomous legal entities. The appointment of 
the top management is to be approved by the President of 
the Republic.
C. Subsidiary Companies of GIEs; corporations whose 
majority share holder is a GIE. Some GIEs act as holding
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companies (i.e., Korea Development Bank). The activities 
of subsidiary companies are closely related to those of 
investing GIEs.
D. Other Government-Backed Enterprises; where the 
government holds less than 50 percent of the stock. In 
most cases, the government contributes a small proportion 
of the equity share with the remaining portion subscribed 
by various bodies in the public sector. The top 
management of subsidiary companies of GIEs and other 
government-backed enterprises should be chosen at the 
stockholders' meeting. Being the majority shareholder 
through direct and indirectly-held shares, the government 
can decisively influence the appointment.
E. Local Public Enterprises; these are established by the 
local governments and provide local services such as 
water, health and housing. They include Seoul Subways and 
Pusan Subways. The number of local PEs was only 7 in 
1969, but increased rapidly to 119 by 1988, mainly due to 
the expansion of local services.25
3. Origins and Growth
The philosophy of laissez-faire which was propounded 
by the classical economists and which dominated the 
economic and political scene of the world during the 17th 
and 18th centuries, started giving way to state
regulation and control in the 19th century. With the 
passage of time, it was recognised that mere regulation 
and control is not enough, and that to execute its 
policies effectively, the state must directly participate 
in business. The First and Second World Wars necessitated 
a further increase in state intervention. To mobilise 
maximum resources for war, it was essential for the state 
to control and regulate the apparatus of production. For 
most of the countries in the world, but to a lesser 
degree in the United States, the two or three decades 
after World War II were particularly marked by increasing 
intervention by the state in the economic field.
The most important factor leading to an expansion of 
state intervention in economic affairs was the social 
injustice which accompanied the industrial revolution. 
The era of industrial revolution saw the inhumanity of 
man to man and a brutalization of human nature in those 
very societies where the greatest advances were being 
made in the fields of science, technology and 
organization. Thus, the tremendous increase in government 
activities and their expansion to areas that may be 
considered competitive with private enterprise represent 
a major change in the operation of the free enterprise 
system. The government has become an economic actor in 
its own right. PE has become a world-wide phenomenon in 
the twentieth century and come into existence in all
41
countries, whether capitalistic or socialistic, developed 
or underdeveloped.26
Of the developed European countries operating mixed 
economies, Britain and France provide the most 
interesting examples of the evolution of PE sectors 
through a series of legislative measures. In both 
countries there was extensive nationalization during the 
period immediately following World War II, but neither 
country lacked previous experience of running PEs.
In Britain, the political debate on state 
intervention and nationalization started towards the end 
of the 19th century and was initially centred on the 
railways and coal mines. For instance, government 
regulation of railways dates from 1840, when the Board of 
Trade Railway Department was set up. For more than 20 
years there had been no significant increase in the 
government's powers. But from 1868 onwards the tendency 
towards greater government intervention resumed in the 
fields of safety, rates and working hours.27
The Post Office had already grown up as a government 
service and has largely remained outside the 
nationalization debate. Other service industries, such as 
gas, electricity, water and the tramways were gradually 
coming into municipal ownership by the turn of the 
century. Municipalisation of utilities, usually justified 
on the grounds that they were either natural local
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monopolies or required regulation of competition in order 
to meet public service standards, was seen as a separate 
issue from rationalisation and one which was relatively 
free from political controversy.
Some PEs were created by Conservative, Liberal and 
National Governments before 1945, not only as a logical 
extension of municipalisation but also on 'economy of 
scale' arguments. For example, in 1908 the Port of London 
Authority was established and, soon after, the Post 
Office was given an effective telephone monopoly. In 
1926, the Central Electricity Board was set up in order 
to achieve the nationwide economies of scale which had 
become technically feasible. In 1933 the London Passenger 
Transport Board was created with the purpose of achieving 
a coordinated and unified public service, and road 
passenger transport in other cities was already in part 
owned by public bodies. In 1939 the two civil airways 
companies, already heavily subsidised, were 
nationalised.28
Britain also nationalized the Bank of England as well 
as the coal industry in 1946. In the same year, the 
Labour Government created three independent public 
corporations: British Overseas Airways Corporation,
British European Airways and British South American 
Airways. In 1947, several transport industries, including 
the railways, were nationalized, and the gas industry
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became state-owned in 1948. The major part of the iron 
and steel industry was nationalized in 1949.29 After the 
major nationalization programme between 1945 and 1951, 
Britain maintained a significant PE sector in the economy 
until Margaret Thatcher came to power in 1979.
In France, although a dirigiste tradition has existed 
ever since the days of Colbert in the 17th century, it 
was only after World War II that major political action 
was taken to set up PEs. The turning point was General 
Charles de Gaulle's speech in October, 1944 when he 
announced the takeover by the state of the management of 
all large wealth. A morality argument subsequently led to 
the public appropriation of firms whose owners had 
collaborated with the Nazis during the war. This was the 
case with Renault and the two companies that today 
comprise SNIAS.30 In addition, successive governments had 
established the National Nitrates Office, acquired a 
majority of shares in the Compagnie Generale 
Transatlantique and the railways, nationalized the 
aircraft manufacturing companies, and become a majority 
or minority participant in the equity of a number of 
other undertakings. France undertook a much more 
extensive nationalization than Britain of financial 
enterprises. While Britain brought the Bank of England 
under public ownership, France nationalized not only the 
Bank of France but the four great deposit banks, 34
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insurance companies, and a variety of other financial 
institutions.
Similarly, developing countries have many examples of 
PEs. There is hardly any country where the government 
does not actively participate in the establishment and 
management of PEs. Such enterprises range from transport 
systems, generation and distribution of power, supply of 
water, mining and processing of minerals and banking to 
various industrial enterprises. The growth of PE is due 
to a variety of motives, pressures and purposes which 
differ from country to country, and from government to 
government.
4. The Motives
State ownership has been argued for various reasons 
such as ideology, economic reasoning, social structure 
and administrative convenience. Although elements of each 
of these explanations can be found throughout the history 
of state ownership in different countries, none gives the 
total picture in all its complexity. Countries differ in 
their cultural heritage, economic structure, the 
traditional role of government and the availability of 
indigenous entrepreneurs. PEs have been created for a 
variety of practical reasons including the stimulation of 
economic growth, the development of priority sectors of
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the economy, the acquisition by the nation of enterprises 
previously owned by non-nationals, investment in a sector 
not attracting private capital but considered vital to 
the economy, the pursuit of specific social objectives 
through direct government intervention, and support for 
economic recovery in a time of crisis. Of course national 
resource development can also be achieved and economic 
benefits maximised by government intervention in a number 
of ways other than by direct government ownership and 
participation.31
The PE was chosen as the best organisational entity 
for these purposes for a number of reasons. Essentially 
it enables government to retain policy and financial 
control over an enterprise, while at the same time 
permitting it to operate independently of civil service 
rules and regulations. Although the release from civil 
service regulations was not an unmitigated blessing, it 
was considered desirable in order, for instance, to offer 
higher salaries where necessary to attract qualified 
managerial and professional personnel and to take 
decisions easily and promptly without the necessity of 
going through several ministerial channels for approval.
The extent and nature of governmental involvement in 
the productive activities of a country are largely 
determined by a government's political philosophy, the 
state of economic development of the country and
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historical circumstances among other factors. Thus, PEs 
have invested in highly capital-intensive industries as 
a means of import substitution in some countries. The 
involvement of PEs in such industries is usually intended 
to make the country industrially independent of other 
countries.
In other cases, PEs are in capital-intensive 
industries because of entrepreneurial substitution by the 
state. This is the case with industries such as steel in 
Korea and Argentina. This development takes place because 
of the inability and unwillingness of private 
entrepreneurs to invest due to the size of the projects 
or the risk and uncertainty involved. Still another 
reason may be to prevent the widening of a technological 
gap or to achieve a higher level of technology. This is 
one reason that state intervention and investment 
increased in some of the European countries. They were 
concerned about the widening of the technological gap 
between Europe and the United States that could place 
their domestic industries in a weaker competitive 
position and place them under the control of 
international companies. For example, in Italy, 
investment in highly modern food processing PEs is the 
result of a fear that U.S. firms would dominate Italian 
food processing companies.32 In such cases the underlying 
reasons for state control played a more important role
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than any other factors.
These factors sometimes overlap, and therefore, a 
clear-cut distinction for discussing a single cause is 
almost impossible. However,if we take this question 
conceptually rather than historically, ideological and 
economic factors seem to be the most important reasons 
for the existence of PE.
A. Socialist Ideology
In socialist ideology, the transfer of ownership of 
wealth-producing assets from the private to the public 
sector is a prerequisite for a better world and for 
social justice, and a necessary condition for a true 
democracy. The British Labour Party's nationalization 
policy in 1945-51 sprang from a conviction that socialism 
requires the public ownership and operation of the basic 
industries concerned with fuel and power, transport and 
the essential raw materials on which the entire economy 
depends.33
It was further held that a policy of full employment 
demands effective control of currency and credit through 
public ownership of the central bank. Although this view 
was a naive assumption, it was reinforced by bitter 
memories of Bank of England policy during the great 
depression in the 1920s and 1930s. It was argued that 
industrial well-being was sacrificed to financial
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interests, capital expenditure restricted by high rates 
of interest and the misery of prolonged unemployment 
suffered by millions of people for nearly two decades. 
The Labour Party determined that never again should the 
people be at the mercy of Bank of England policy at all 
costs. The financial crisis of 1931 was also remembered 
as an indication of the case with which financiers can 
create a state of insecurity and bring about a political 
crisis by manipulating the instruments they control.
There was the argument that certain industries which 
are by their nature monopolistic must be taken over 
because it is too dangerous to leave them to be exploited 
by private enterprise for profit. There was the belief 
that competition leads to a waste of resources and that 
nationalization would avoid duplication in at least the 
basic industries which require very large capital 
expenditure. It was hoped that, if capitalist enterprise 
were replaced by public ownership and operation, an era 
of harmonious labour relations and greater equality would 
be ushered in. These general doctrines played a very 
important role in prompting the Labour Governments of 
1945-51 to launch the nationalization programme.34
At the other ideological extreme, any government 
intervention in the workings of economic markets is 
perceived to be wrong and evil and leading to an 
excessive and dangerous concentration of power. Moreover,
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government is assumed to be both corruptible and 
incapable of running business activities efficiently.35 
Those who argue thus maintain that it is possible to 
maintain full employment in a mixed economy without 
having to extend the scope of the PE sector. In addition, 
greater equality has been brought about not so much by 
nationalization as by the growth of social services, 
severe taxation of high incomes, and an increase in the 
share of the national income enjoyed by wage and salary 
earners, resulting from the power of the trade unions.36
There is a tendency in Britain to regard PE as a 
question of political ideology, with the Labour Party 
being seen as the party of nationalization and the 
Conservatives as the champion of private enterprise. 
However, the reality is more complicated and political 
ideology has not consistently applied. The first 
important nationalization measures of the present century 
were enacted by Conservative governments. Since the major 
nationalization programme, Labour governments have fought 
shy of much further extension of public ownership, just 
as Conservative governments did little to reduce it 
before 1979. Professor Parris describes this trend:
It would be more accurate to say that until 
1979 both Labour and Conservative governments 
tended to foster a kind of corporatism: restricting 
competition in both public and private sectors; 
maintaining a consensus with trade unions, 
financial institutions and business and 
professional associations; setting up dirigiste 
bodies (such as the Industrial Reorganisation
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Corporation designed to promote mergers); and in 
this process limiting the scope for innovation in 
industry and the consumer's freedom of choice. The 
reaction against these developments has tended to 
concentrate attention on the failings of public 
enterprises, especially those supplying the public 
directly. The large monolithic public corporation 
created by the post-war Labour government soon 
became unpopular with the British public. The 
present day Labour Party seems to be recognising 
the disadvantages of the Morrisonian concept of 
nationalisation and now talk of a shift towards 
more flexible forms of public ownership, exposed to 
some degree of competition.37
Nevertheless, ideology does count for something, and 
in some countries and at some periods it counts for a 
good deal. This explains the contraction of the PE sector 
in Britain since 1979 and the spectacular growth of the 
PE sector in France in 1982, when 6 big industrial 
corporations and 66 banks were nationalized by the Left 
wing party.38
Ideological reasons were important in certain 
developing countries. The belief that government control 
over the commanding heights of the economy is a necessary 
condition for establishing socialism is explicitly stated 
in the 1948 and 1956 Industrial Policy Resolutions in 
India, in which certain industries are declared as 
exclusively reserved for public ownership. Tanzania also 
created many PEs on the basis of socialist ideology.39
B. Economic Reasoning: Market Failure
The market system is said to fail to achieve, because
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of imperfections in itself, economic efficiency (Pareto- 
optimum) which is feasible given the resources and 
technological possibilities in the economy. Market 
failure may manifest itself either in the inability of 
the system to produce goods which are wanted or by a 
maldistribution of resources which could be improved in 
such a way that some consumers would be better off and 
none worse off, i.e. resource allocation is not Pareto- 
optimum.
Theory suggests that market failure tends to occur in 
the presence of monopoly and oligopoly or when 
significant externalities exist. In these cases it is 
argued that government intervention is justified and then 
suggested that setting up a PE to supply the goods or 
service concerned is a means of 'correcting' the market 
failure.40
The most relevant and important example of this is 
the case of so-called 'natural monopoly'. A natural 
monopoly exists when cost conditions in an industry are 
such that one firm can produce a particular output at a 
lower cost than is possible under any other organization 
of production. Where there is only one output, natural 
monopoly would result from significant economies of scale 
up to the level of market demand. Where there are several 
outputs, 'economies of scope' rather than economies of 
scale may give rise to natural monopoly. That is, it may
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be cheaper for one firm to produce the entire set of 
outputs than for different firms to produce subsets of 
them.
Natural monopoly has been a very marked feature of 
the so-called public utilities - water, gas, electricity, 
rail transport, telephone services - where high costs 
have to be incurred in establishing a supply network. It 
would be prohibitively expensive to have two or more 
competing firms constructing alternative networks so that 
each consumer would have a choice of supplier. A single 
network then has been taken to imply a single seller.
If the seller is a profit-maximizing monopolist, 
theory predicts that price will be raised above marginal 
cost and output of the good will be restricted below its 
optimal level. To have the natural monopoly in the hands 
of a PE may then be seen as a way of retaining the cost 
advantage of a sole seller while preventing the resource 
misallocation which would result from a profit-seeking 
monopoly.41
The argument for PE as a corrective of the market 
failure could be extended by considering the possibility 
of dynamic market failure. This refers to the proposition 
that the private capital market in an economy may be 
insufficiently well developed, or investors in it too 
myopic or risk-averse, to provide adequate finance for 
important sectors of industry. Organizing these sectors
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as PEs and supplying them with capital raised by the 
state is then seen as a means of compensating for the 
shortcomings of the private capital market.
In the early 1970s, two important British companies, 
the motorcar manufacturers British Leyland and Rolls- 
Royce, were on the verge of bankruptcy. The financial 
institutions which were the major creditors of the 
companies were unwilling to supply further finance, 
presumably because they were pessimistic about the 
chances that the companies would be able to return to 
profitability within the time horizon they considered 
appropriate. The general consequences of these 
bankruptcies - in terms of lost employment, exports, and, 
in the case of Rolls-Royce, technological capabilities - 
were considered sufficiently serious that the companies 
were nationalized, or reconstituted as PEs.
Substantial injections of capital were made, not only 
to restore the companies to financial viability but also 
to finance investment in new production facilities. As 
PEs, the companies were able to rationalize and invest, 
whereas the scale of losses and the view taken of the 
time required and risks involved in their return to 
profitability deterred private investors from financing 
this process.42
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CHAPTER III
THE EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES IN KOREA
Before moving on to discuss in detail the role of PEs 
in economic development, it will be necessary to make 
some observations on Korea's turbulent modern history 
with regard to the socio-political background for 
industrialization, through which the dominant role of the 
public sector has emerged. Since the late 19th century, 
Korea has been beset by successive calamitous events 
which have brought destruction and profound distress to 
all portions of society. Geopolitically situated where 
the convergent interests of states all larger and more 
powerful than itself are focused, it has been a 
battleground, an invasion route, a colony and a divided 
country which has seen physical, cultural and political 
devastation on a rarely equalled scale.
1. The Historical Background to Modernization
During its 500-year rule the Yi dynasty (1392-1910) 
passed through several brilliant periods of intellectual 
and cultural achievement.1 But in the latter 19th 
century, while the country was attempting to adjust to 
the western international system, the dynasty fell into
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a state of disintegration. A long policy of isolation had 
not only preserved the country's identity and territorial 
integrity but had also cut off Koreans from the flow of 
ideas and technological development that penetrated much 
of the rest of the world. An extremely centralized 
autocracy, free from sustained internal critical force, 
external pressure and foreign influences for several 
centuries, had become weak and corrupt. The result was 
inept response to new demands upon the government that 
arose as foreign powers entered into relations with 
Korea. The Confucian principles had been pursued to such 
extreme ends that government was corrupt, inefficient and 
inflexible.
The social class in the Yi dynasty was loosely 
divided into the ruling (yangban) and the ruled classes. 
The yangban class made up the bulk of the officials of 
the imperial bureaucracy until they were pushed out by 
the invading Japanese bureaucrats. The yangban 
aristocracy consisted of two subgroups: the civilian
(munkwan) and the military (mukwan). Industry consisted 
primarily of household industries producing basic 
consumer goods, such as textiles, ceramics, paper, rice- 
cleaning, brewing, metal-working, cabinet-making and the 
like.2 During much of the Yi dynasty, social restrictions 
has discouraged activities that were generally regarded 
as economic in nature. The yangban class was forbidden to
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engage in trade, and the merchant class (many of them 
pedlars), constituting about 6 percent of the total 
population, received encouragement from neither the 
national policy nor the normative social system.3
Therefore, the disintegrated state of the society 
when Korea emerged from isolation was severely reflected 
on industry and the unusual economic backwardness was 
appropriately reported by McCune:
An earlier notable craftsmanship had suffered a 
long decline and the singular isolation of the 
country left technology sterile. The stagnated 
Korean economy was meagre, much more so than even 
that of either Japan or China. The country remained 
medieval. Political corruption and decadence 
thwarted economic development. Wealth and the 
instruments of economic action were in the hands of 
the long-since impotent noble yangban class, or 
landed aristocracy. The bulk of the population 
remained tied in virtual serfdom to the land. The 
absolutism and caprice of the system with its 
oppressive taxes, venal exactions, and extreme 
insecurity of property successfully prevented the 
rise of a sizable and influential merchant class 
such as was associated with the evolution of 
European capitalism from the medieval economy.4
For many centuries Korea had maintained tributary 
status within the orbit of the Chinese Confucian system 
without restricting her own independence. Contact with 
China, therefore, had been relatively unhampered and 
extensive. There had also been a more or less constant 
contact between Korea and Japan from 1609 on, although 
these contacts were limited to one port, Pusan.5 Trade 
was carried on between the two countries through this 
port and a modern 'Kanghwa Treaty' took the place of the
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old agreement in 1876. Yi dynasty's unpreparedness for 
foreign trade, however, accelerated the penetration of 
Japanese capitalism. Initially, the Japanese were not 
bound by treaty to pay tariffs, thus deprived Korea of a 
means of protecting her inefficient handicraft 
industries. Moreover, Yi dynasty's defective monetary 
system led to the influx of foreign money.6
In the decade 1895-1905 western diplomacy opened 
Korea to much greater western influence. For a time after 
Korea was opened up, China was able to maintain her 
traditional influence and in a limited way encouraged 
economic development. Russia obtained significant trading 
rights but lacked the capital to invest. For a time 
American capital played an important role: the first
modern mines, the first electric lighting, the first 
modern office building, the first gas plant and the first 
street railway were all American. The first railway in 
the country, the line from Inchon to Seoul, was commenced 
under concessions to Americans.7
At this time Russian interests in Korea came into 
conflict with Japanese imperial ambitions. The ultimate 
result of this clash was the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5) 
which successfully eliminated the Russians from their 
position as rivals of the Japanese in the peninsula. The 
United States could have aided Korean independence, but 
any initiative by its representatives in Korea was
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frustrated by the U.S. government's indifference and 
indecision.8 Consequently both the international rivalry 
and the unique importance to American enterprise were 
short-lived. Step by step, in spite of vigorous 
opposition by the Korean people, Japanese ambition was 
accomplished. Annexation was finally completed in 1910, 
at which time Korea became a colony of Japan.
Nonetheless, the failure of Korea at the turn of the 
century was in her political leadership, not in the 
society as a whole; certain elements of the society were 
far ahead of its political leadership. The Japanese were 
able to undertake most of their reforms and institution 
building on a base of Korean precedents, both legislative 
and educational.9
2. Industrialization during the Colonial Period
In subjugating Korea, the Japanese had an advantage 
over the West in sharing some of the same Chinese 
tradition and the Chinese writing system. However, Korean 
hostility toward Japan was traditional, and memories of 
the devastation wreaked by Hideyoshi's forces in the late 
sixteenth century were still vivid. Moreover, the Koreans 
did not consider the Japanese to be superior, as some 
peoples did consider their colonial overlords. On the 
contrary, the Koreans thought of themselves as superior.
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It is now generally acknowledged even by the Japanese 
that Korea was the source, or the channel for many 
Japanese cultural elements.10
Japan had officially publicized its colonial role as 
primarily that of a teacher and civilizer to promote an 
image of benign capitalism. Yet the prominence of 
military leaders11 selected to direct the colony and the 
stringency of their control were evidence of the 
strategic importance of the peninsula: a buffer against 
continental aggression and a base for expansion into 
Manchuria and China. An example of this role was the 
railways. These were in large part conceived as a means 
of transshipment of Japanese goods into Manchuria, and a 
number of them had been built solely for military 
reasons. In 1936 the Japanese Director of the Government- 
General Railway Bureau made a telling statement on the 
role of Korea and its transportation system in Japanese 
affairs:
With the advent of Manchoukuo as the turning 
point, there has taken place... an almost 
phenomenal economic development, naturally followed 
by the spectacular growth of general transportation 
means. Thus the mighty trio of Government railway 
lines, private lines and motorcar routes, coupled 
with the Japan Sea routes... have elevated the 
peninsula to a position more valuable as a land- 
bridge connecting Japan with the continents of Asia 
and Europe. Inasmuch as Chosen constitutes Japan's 
barricade and life-and-death line of vital 
importance from a view-point of national defence, 
it is all the more significant to complete the 
network of transportation in the peninsula.12
In addition, the Japanese government never wavered in
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its commitment to security and economic development of 
the peninsula. In the proclamation of annexation in 1910, 
the Governor-General declared:
It is a natural and inevitable course of things 
that two peoples, whose countries are in close 
proximity with each other, whose interests are 
identical and who are bound together with brotherly 
feelings, should amalgamate and form one body. 
Being desirous of securing the safety and welfare 
of Chosen as well as of maintaining the permanent 
peace of the Extreme East, His Majesty the Emperor 
of Japan has, in compliance with the wish expressed 
by the Sovereign of Korea, accepted the cession of 
all the rights of sovereignty over the country... 
The fundamental object of administration is to 
promote the security of life and property, whereon 
depends the general industrial development of a 
nation... In coming to this country under the 
command of my Imperial Master, I have no other 
desire than that of increasing the welfare and 
happiness of the people placed under my 
administration.13
In reality Japanese domination of Korea was no more 
beneficial for the Koreans, and possibly less so, than 
were other colonial regimes for their subjects. A forced- 
delivery (kongchul) system was an example. As it became 
impossible to supply food by free purchase, the Japanese 
government imposed a stated price on rice produced in 
Korea from 1940 until August 1945. The quota for rice 
under the forced-delivery system amounted to over 70 
percent of the total production at a price lower than 
half of the production cost.14 Exploitation was the 
keynote and virtually every development was undertaken 
with the objective of maximizing the benefits which would 
accrue either directly or indirectly to Japan. It was
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observed that there are few countries in the world, even 
among the colonies, where such a large portion of the 
goods were taken out of the country.15
Accordingly, the Korean economy became highly 
dependent upon Japan for capital, technology and 
management. Of the total authorized capital of business 
establishments in the peninsula, the Japanese owned 
approximately 94 percent as of 1940. Japanese engineers 
and technicians employed in manufacturing, construction, 
and public utilities in 1944 constituted about 80 percent 
of the total technical manpower in Korea. The proportion 
of Korean engineers and technicians was particularly 
small in the metal and chemical industries (11 to 12 
percent). The relative number of Korean business 
establishments was very small in high-technology 
industries - about 10 percent in the metal and chemical 
industries and 25 percent in the machinery industry.16 
Most Korean establishments were small and used simpler 
technology. As a consequence few Koreans had been trained 
in skills required for self-directed economy through the 
colonial period.
The Government-General kept a tight rein on the 
Korean populace and denied their political participation 
while encouraging a limited role in the economy. The 
state played a key role in the colonial economy through 
changes in civil law relating to finance, with
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legislation affecting the mobilization of capital and 
credit resources, but also with its own massive resources 
for investment. The Government-General and associated 
agencies held 19 percent of total Japanese assets on the 
peninsula by 1945, amounting to 14.9 billion yen out of 
a total of 88.6 billion yen of real estate and plant 
investments.17
In the Meiji era (1868-1912), the imperial Japanese 
government fostered modern PEs, often using funds 
borrowed from abroad and employing Europeans as advisers. 
Once the industries were brought to a paying basis, they 
were sold to private companies. Thus, it was the 
government who launched the industrial revolution in 
Japan.18 Therefore, it was natural that PE was among the 
first Japanese institutional exports to the new colony. 
As early as 1908, two years before annexation, the 
Japanese residency general ran both Rail and 
Communications Bureaus employing over 4,000 people or 
more than 40 percent of the total government 
employment.19
The most important later addition was the Monopoly 
Bureau which was responsible for buying, processing and 
selling ginseng, salt, opium and tobacco. Ginseng had 
long been an official monopoly as had salt imports, but 
with annexation both activities were expanded and salt 
production added. Tobacco was added to the list of
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monopoly products in 1921, following unsatisfactory 
efforts at extracting excess profits via special taxes.20 
Opium was added in the 1920s, but yielded only a few 
percent of total monopoly profits. Overall, the 
departmental PEs accounted for about one-quarter of total 
government revenue in the decade following annexation, 
and this increased to over 50 percent from 1926 on. 
Expenditures generally exceeded revenues prior to 1926 
but were below them for the next decade, resulting in 
profits contributing amounts equivalent to between 5 and 
35 percent of the total tax revenue.21
Apart from the departmental PEs, there were some 
joint-stock companies with strong government involvement. 
Among them, the Oriental Development Company (ODC), the 
Bank of Chosen, and the Chosen Industrial Bank are worth 
mentioning. ODC was established in 1908 for Japanese 
agricultural migration to Korea, and later expanded into 
a development company with extensive landholding and 
finance capital for agricultural and industrial projects. 
By 1942, the firm operated branches in China and 
Manchuria as well as Korea, with an authorized capital of 
100 million yen and an annual budget of 512.5 million 
yen. Among the largest shareholders, the Finance Ministry 
in Japan held 3 percent and the Secretary of the Imperial 
Household held 2.5 percent.22
As an holding company, ODC owned and managed large
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tracts of land in the peninsula and invested heavily in 
major utilities and resource development projects. The 
firm held large blocks of shares in leading utilities 
such as the Chosen Railway Company, Chosen Electric, 
Nansen Hydroelectric, Chosen Electric Transmission, and 
the Chosen Yalu River Hydroelectric Generation Company. 
Mining investments included equity in Chosen Petroleum, 
Chosen Anthracite Coal, Chosen Magnesite Development, and 
its own Totaku Mining.23
The Bank of Chosen and the Chosen Industrial Bank 
played a major role in capital formation in the 
peninsula, whether in support of other banks, or 
providing credit and subsidies for large-scale projects 
in agriculture, business and industry. The Bank of Chosen 
functioned as a central bank and later as a main 
financial institution for Japanese expansion into 
Manchuria. Within the peninsula the Bank was responsible 
for currency circulation and foreign exchange, treasury 
operation for the government-general, and providing 
commercial banks with funds for loan operations. The 
government-general was the leading stockholder in the 
bank with about 4 percent of the shares.24
The Chosen Industrial Bank specialized in medium and 
long-term financing for agriculture and industry in the 
peninsula, based on a system of regional development 
banks. The colonial authorities reorganized the regional
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system into the Chosen Industrial Bank in 1918 with a 
substantial increase in capital and debt ceiling, and a 
network of 47 branches. Two decades later the bank 
operated 74 branches, the most extensive banking 
operation in Korea. The Japanese Imperial Household and 
the government-general were major stockholders in the 
joint-stock corporation.25
Because of political oppression and economic 
exploitation by the colonial regime, many Koreans are 
reluctant to acknowledge any beneficial contribution made 
by the Japanese during the occupation period.26 
Nonetheless, a less critical evaluation was made by a 
Korean scholar:
During the thirty-six year annexation period, 
Koreans were never allowed to participate in any 
political activities in a modern sense. However, in 
the fields of thought, literature and religion, 
they had access to the trends of the times to some 
extent; from the economic point of view, although 
they lived under a capitalistic economic system, 
the Japanese had complete control over the Korean 
economy. And from the social point of view, Korean 
society, whether compulsorily or spontaneously, was 
gradually growing into a modern society.27
Indeed, although the Japanese regime benefitted the 
Japanese disproportionately, the changes set in place 
during the 35 years of occupation would affect the 
society and economy of Korea well after liberation in 
1945. Urban residents grew from 3 percent to 13 percent 
of the total population between 1910 to 1944.28 The Yi 
dynasty capital of Seoul and later, headquarters for the
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Japanese colonial administration, prospered as a major 
industrial and commercial centre with a population of 
nearly one million. Other cities such as Pusan and 
Pyongyang developed as regional centres of commerce and 
industry.
Urban centres flourished with increased currency 
circulation, commercial banking, and growth in trading, 
manufacturing, and regional markets for commercial 
agriculture. The value of agriculture production nearly 
doubled through 1940, and the value of mining and 
manufacturing increased some 1500 percent from 1910.29 
Such data would support the more positive evaluation of 
the colonial contribution to economic growth.
3. Postwar Turmoil and Reconstruction
In the 16 years between the end of colonial rule in 
1945 and the establishment of the Park Government, the 
South Korean people struggled to develop and survive in 
the face of a severed nation, American military rule 
(1945-48) , the increasingly inept Syngman Rhee Government 
(1948-60), a devastating Korean War (1950-53), the April 
Student Revolution (1960), the short-lived Chang Myon 
Government (1960-61), and the military coup led by Park 
in 1961. With the compressed political turmoil, massive 
social dislocations and horrifying destruction of life
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and property that occurred in this period, consistent 
economic policy and sustained progress were impossible.
When Japan was defeated in the War, Korea, like 
Germany, emerged as a divided country as a result of the 
military occupation by the United States in the south and 
by the Soviet Union in the north of the peninsula. The 
north became a pawn of Soviet power, the south of 
American power. The south was run by an American military 
government from 1945 to 1948, when the first national 
elections were held and an independent government was 
established.
By the end of the colonial rule, industry in Korea 
was such an integral part of the economy of Greater Japan 
that most of the existing industrial plant was incapable 
of independent operation. For capital goods Korea relied 
almost wholly upon Japan, and certain important stages in 
the production of consumer goods also depended on 
Japanese parts or supplies. For example, light bulbs were 
fabricated in Korea, but the tungsten filaments used in 
these bulbs were manufactured in Japan, even though Korea 
was a large producer of tungsten ores. The ores were 
shipped to Japan to be refined and manufactured into 
wire, which was then shipped back to Korea for use in the 
production of light bulbs.30 Therefore, the sudden 
retreat of the Japanese and the separation of the economy 
from the Japanese economic bloc brought about a
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suspension of many production activities in Korea.
In addition, the collapse of trade between the north 
and south brought utter economic chaos to South Korea. 
Most of the natural resources and heavy industry were 
concentrated in the north, while the country's food- 
basket and light industry were in the south. 
Approximately 92 percent of the average annual power 
generation had come from plants in the north. The north 
also produced about 90 percent of Korea's output of metal 
products and 83 percent of its chemical products in 1940. 
By contrast, the south accounted for 85 percent of 
textile production and 89 percent of printing and 
publishing output.31
Between 1945-50, an influx of Korean repatriates from 
Japan and elsewhere and a flood of refugees from the 
communist regime in the north increased the population by 
2 0 percent.32 Rice production, which had depended on 
fertilizer produced in the north, fell, while what rice 
was produced failed to reach the urban populations and 
was consumed in the countryside. Mass starvation was 
averted only by the importation of large quantities of 
wheat from the United States. North Korea cut the supply 
of electricity in May 1948, depriving the south of over 
half of its already inadequate power.
What industry had been located in the south was 
unable to function for lack of raw materials and energy.
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In 1946, South Korean manufacturing plants had been 
reduced by more than half of the pre-1945 number and 
those still in operation were producing at only 20 
percent of capacity. Transportation and mining facilities 
likewise posed serious rehabilitation problems after 
liberation. The railway was able to keep no more than 55 
to 60 percent of its locomotives in operation in the 
1946-47 period, and at one point only 30 of Seoul's 257 
trams were in operation. Many mines did not resume 
operation for many months to several years after 
liberation and required extensive rehabilitation.33
Nevertheless, there were good harvests and 
substantial progress in industry during the first two 
years of the First Republic: coal production was
increased by 40 percent; power generation by 33 percent; 
industrial production by 50 percent. For the people in 
the south, this was probably the best year they had had 
in a decade. Despite formidable obstacles, the economic 
outlook in the spring of 1950 was reasonably 
optimistic.34
An important and popular land reform was implemented 
during this period. It was inaugurated in June 1949 to 
redistribute some 23 percent of the total arable land in 
South Korea which had previously been owned by Japanese 
or by Koreans with more than 7.5 acres. Approximately
970,000 tenant farmers and landless farm labours became
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landowners, and about 570,000 small farmers were able to 
expand the size of their holdings. Thus about 62 percent 
of Korea's 2.5 million farm families benefitted from the 
reform.35 Tenant farming was abolished in a country where 
a century before most of the population were serfs or in 
near serf status. There were some complaints that the 
fragmenting of larger farms reduced total production, but 
the political and social advantages were enormous. The 
land reform may well have been the most important 
political and economic accomplishment of the decade in 
Korea, since it was the only major programme which 
responded fully and directly to the aspirations of the 
common people.
Partially as a result of Japanese policy restricting 
the rise of a Korean industrial or management elite, the 
business caste in Korean industry was small. And by 1945 
considerable fluidity and laxness were evident in the 
older class structure as a result of the long decline in 
the political and economic foundations of traditional 
class distinctions. Many of these levelling influences, 
particularly the economic ones, were further reinforced 
by the land reform and the destruction during the Korean 
War.
The Korean War, however, wiped out the fragile 
industries in a few months as the North Korean armies 
advanced south in June 1950. Battles raged up and down
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most of the peninsula until the front stabilized around 
the 38th parallel and a truce was signed in July 1953. 
The level of destruction was extremely high even by the 
standards of modern warfare. In addition to the millions 
of people killed and injured, industrial facilities were 
heavily bombed, thus eliminating most of the limited 
industrial capacity. Physical loss in the south was equal 
to the entire 1953 national product.36
The patterns of economic development in the two 
halves of Korea, which were already divergent before the 
war, moved rapidly in the direction of capitalism in the 
south and communism in the north. In the south, what was 
left of the industrial plant was mostly turned over to 
private owners - some of whom, however, were chosen as 
much for political loyalty as for economic acumen. 
Although there was some investment in import-substitution 
industries and textiles, the primary emphasis was on food 
and other consumer goods to meet minimal living 
requirements. With revenues from foreign aid supporting 
over half the republic's budget, the economy had fairly 
well stabilized by 1957, and living standards had 
recovered to pre-World War II level.37
The Inherited Public Enterprises
When Korea was liberated she inherited over 2,500 
operating industrial and business enterprises from the
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Japanese.38 Most of these, dissipated though they were at 
that time, were taken into government control, thereby 
constituting a public enterprise sector from the 
beginning: a few of the largest enterprises inherited 
were turned over to be managed by nascent government 
departments (i.e., electricity, railways, communications, 
tobacco, and coal mining).
The bulk of manufacturing enterprises, however, were 
entrusted to the American Office of the Property 
Custodian which delegated operating responsibility to 
selected Korean managers. In January 1948, not more than 
20 percent of these enterprises were in full or partial 
operation. Although economic circumstances were highly 
unfavourable to an effective transfer, the political and 
social chaos were even more important deterrents. As an 
American official reported, 'The property custodians were 
subject to all sorts of pressures from high-ranking 
military officers, representative of national agencies, 
their civil officer colleagues, and Korean friends'.39
The Korean War not only devastated fragile industries 
but also brought a shift in the official attitude towards 
PE. The 1948 constitution had a decidedly socialist bent, 
specifying public ownership of a broad range of economic 
activity and open-ended provisions allowing 
nationalization of any other industries 'related to the 
public welfare' or where 'required for vital and urgent
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needs for national defence or the livelihood of the 
people'. The 1954 constitution, in contrast, reserves no 
specific industries for public ownership and explicitly 
prohibits nationalization 'except in cases determined by 
law to meet urgent necessities of national defence or 
national ec ono m y' T he  change is probably not explained 
by ideological conversion so much as by the winnowing of 
war ; South Koreans of socialist persuasion who survived 
the war either went north or kept quiet. Thus the Korean 
War added ideological homogeneity to an already 
culturally homogeneous population and significantly 
narrowed the range of economic dialogue.
At the end of the Korean War most of the property was 
still in the hands of the government, including 90 
percent of all industrial plant. By law, the vested 
interests were divided into four groups. Firstly, the 
public utilities and monopolies (ginseng, tobacco, salt) 
directly under ministers and departments. Secondly, five 
public corporations either government-owned or with the 
government holding a controlling share, i.e. the mint, 
the Bank of Korea, the Daehan Coal Corporation, the 
Korean Shipping Corporation, and the Daehan Shipbuilding 
Corporation. Thirdly, the so-called 'central' vested 
properties, including the tungsten mining company, the 
electric power corporations, irrigation concerns, and 
various other fairly large industries, all subject to
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overall control by one of the ministries. Finally, the 
'local' vested properties, which it was decided to sell 
to local entrepreneurs. Most of the last named, including 
all cotton textile factories, were indeed disposed of in 
1954.41
What characterized all these PEs was that they had 
not operated on a commercial basis. The National Assembly 
was given the responsibility for fixing the rates and 
charges for services and products. Moreover, the managers 
tended to be appointed for political reasons. The 
assembly's refusal to allow the enterprises to charge 
anything like realistic rates meant that they ran at 
heavy losses and had to be subsidized. The extent of the 
subsidies was frequently concealed because they sometimes 
took the form of selling aid imports to these enterprises 
below cost, and because some accounts were never 
published. Certain main industries such as coal mining 
and shipping figured in the budget in so far as 
government grants were concerned, but others, though 
frequently aided by government-guaranteed bank loans, did 
not appear in the budget at all.42
The pricing policy for coal was a highly 
controversial issue. Until the end of the Rhee government 
only privately owned mines were permitted to sell at open 
market prices, whereas the public sector mines had to 
sell at controlled prices and appreciably below cost. The
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public sector mines were further handicapped by the fact 
that some important end-users of their coal, notably the 
government-owned Korean Electric Power Company failed to 
keep up regular payments for it.43
The economic strategy of the Rhee Government was to 
maximize foreign aid, overvalue the currency, meet the 
government deficit by printing money and bonds, keep 
interest rates low, and focus on import substitution for 
economic growth. The result was inflation, speculation in 
land and goods, and discouragement of saving and 
investment. The approaching political crisis inhibited 
and distorted the economy, at the same time that foreign 
aid was being reduced in response to domestic U.S. 
pressures. Resultant popular frustration at the lack of 
economic progress was a contributing factor in the April 
Student Revolution in 1960.
The brief ensuing Chang Myon period (1960-61) was a 
product of social, political, and economic demands that 
had forcefully been held in check under Rhee. Allowed 
free rein, labour and student demonstrations severely 
restricted the capacity of the administration to govern 
and further unsettled the economy.
Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that 
the government was unable to manage PEs effectively. A 
somewhat extreme statement, tainted by self-interest but, 
nonetheless, reflective of the situation, was made by
79
Park:
Operation of the state-run enterprises is 
convincing proof of the corruption of greedy former 
politicians, before whom the jackpot was thrown 
like a rabbit flung before the starved lion. They 
appointed their own managers. In other words, they 
appointed their own subordinates and received from 
them certain tributes. There was not one trace of 
economic reconstruction. Every time the government 
changed, state-run enterprises became a market 
place. Many scandals which cannot be condoned 
occurred. Comedy and tragedy were publicly 
repeated. The people have experienced these 
scandals themselves and I will not say any more.44
4. Planning under the Park Government
One of the outstanding features of Korea's economic 
development is the leading role that government has 
allocated to itself. Though Korea's economy is often 
described as a free market one, governmental intervention 
in its working can be seen easily, and the public sector 
has been sizeable. Private enterprise has been encouraged 
and supported, but on the understanding that it accepted 
official guidelines and supervision. It is generally 
recognized that full-fledged industrialization by this 
pattern did not start until 1962 when the First Five-Year 
Economic Development Plan was initiated by the Park 
Government.
Following the seizure of power through a coup d'etat 
in 1961, General Park and his military associates were in 
desperate need of a policy to ensure the regime's
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legitimacy and one of the shortcuts to attain this was 
through rapid economic growth. Thus, the Park Government 
put forward the economic well-being of the nation as the 
overriding common good. In the name of the nation, it 
tried to produce economic dynamism by state initiative. 
The dominant position of the state in the accumulation 
process was expressed by the concept of guided 
capitalism; 'the principles of free enterprise will be 
observed, but in which the government will either 
directly participate in or indirectly render guidance to 
the basic industries and other important fields'.45
This guided capitalism was to ensure a strong 
government hand in the basically market-oriented economy, 
involving planned economic growth, government guidance 
and participation. It was through these sorts of policy 
and concerted efforts that Korea achieved almost 
unprecedented economic growth during the two decades 
under Park. The GNP growth rate averaged around 10 
percent per annum until 1980.46
An interesting fact here is that the Park Government 
adopted guided capitalism from the Japanese development 
experience. The Japanese model is highlighted by the 
state's careful guidance of outward-looking development 
in an indicative planning method. Park and his associates 
wished to create another economic miracle in Asia by 
emulating the Japanese model of capitalist development.
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There were two factors behind this attempt. Firstly, the 
senior members of the regime, including Park himself, had 
had Japanese military or bureaucratic training.47 They 
were not only familiar with the Japanese model of 
development but also favoured it. Secondly, recognizing 
similar socio-cultural traditions, they considered state 
guidance to be essential to the promotion of outward- 
looking development.
Rather than promoting laissez-faire capitalism, the 
Park Government turned to guided capitalism aimed at 
central control of the economy. The inner workings of 
guided capitalism were reflected in and integrated into 
the development planning, and it is widely held that 
Korea's rapid economic growth was greatly aided by its 
successful development planning. The consecutively 
planned and implemented five-year development plans were 
the government's main policy tool in coordinating the 
whole system. It is therefore worthwhile to review 
development planning in Korea with regard to its 
institutional framework and policy implications on PEs.
The first efforts at planning in Korea were begun 
during the Korean War by the foreign assistance agencies 
that were trying to assess the best patterns and the 
potential costs of rehabilitating the economy. The main 
result of this work was a programme prepared by Robert 
Nathan for the United Nations Korean Reconstruction
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Agency. This programme was never formally adopted or even 
recognized by the Rhee Government, mainly for political 
reasons. President Rhee was preoccupied with political 
problems and his yearning for reunification was carried 
to the extreme that there was an unwillingness to build 
up the south as an independent and integrated economy. 
The possibility that unification would again give access 
to the electric power and heavy industries of the north 
was given as a reason for holding up the growth of such 
facilities in the south.48
Nonetheless, because no other similar planning work 
was undertaken for several years, the Nathan Plan 
provided the only overall perspective of the Korean 
economy's possible growth path during the rehabilitation 
period. Eventually in 1958 a second planning effort was 
initiated by the newly established Economic Development 
Council of the Korean government. This was to be a seven- 
year plan which would be divided into a three-year and a 
four-year phase. The plan for the first phase, covering 
the years 1960-62, was formulated in 1959 and approved by 
the cabinet in January 1960. Three months later the Rhee 
Government was overthrown and the plan was set aside. In 
the following year, a new five-year plan was prepared by 
the Economic Development Council, but it suffered the 
same fate as the three-year plan. The draft was completed 
just prior to the military coup of May 1961, and was not
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acceptable to the new government which assumed power 
after the coup.49
As soon as the military government assumed power, it 
announced its intention to launch a five-year plan 
beginning in 1962. At the same time, the government 
introduced various institutional changes necessary for 
effective decision-making. The primary goal of the Park 
Government was an acceleration of economic growth. Park 
proclaimed:
In order to ensure efforts to improve the
living conditions of the people in Asia, even 
undemocratic emergency measures may be necessary... 
It is also an undeniable fact that the people of 
Asia today fear starvation and poverty more than 
the oppressive duties thrust upon them by
totalitarianism... In other words, the Asian 
peoples want to obtain economic equality first and 
build a more equitable political machinery
afterwards... The gem without lustre called 
democracy is meaningless to people suffering from 
starvation and despair.50
A major step towards assembling the necessary 
government machinery took place in 1961 with the
establishment of the Economic Planning Board (EPB) 
centred on economic policy-making. The Board took over 
planning responsibility from the recently established 
Ministry of Reconstruction and absorbed the Bureau of 
Budget from the Ministry of Finance, and the Bureau of 
Statistics from the Ministry of Home Affairs. Since it 
was the Bureau of Budget rather than the Ministry of 
Finance that monitored public expenditures, including 
development expenditures, the EPB was at the centre not
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only of medium-term planning but also short-term planning 
and policy-making. The head of the EPB was given the 
title of Deputy Prime Minister. This elevated position 
signified the seriousness of the planning intentions, and 
the EPB was expected to play a prominent role among the 
various economic ministries. The government also 
established the Central Economic Committee, consisting of 
the Prime Minister as chairman, the Deputy Prime Minister 
as vice-chairman, all the ministers concerned with 
economic affairs, and a few outside experts. Finally, the 
overall plans and regulations were coordinated on a 
before-and-after basis by the Economy and Science Council 
under the direct leadership of the President.
The First Five-Year Plan (1962-66), as finally 
published in December 1961, is one of the most 
interesting documents in Korean economic history. Its 
tone and policy recommendations largely reflect the 
thinking of the newly elevated young economists and other 
development-oriented bureaucrats and intellectuals. The 
plan drew heavily on a three-year plan proposal drawn up 
with the help of the same young economists and 
intellectuals under the Rhee Government, but that 
government had left it unacted upon for over a year. The 
plan emphasized the need for infrastructure development 
and declared that the government's economic strategy lay 
in industrialization through exports51:
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The ultimate course of the Korean economy lies 
in industrialization. During the planning period, 
the period of preparation for industrialization, 
emphasis will be placed on the development of 
power, coal, and other energy sources... expansion 
of key industrial facilities and adequate provision 
of social overhead capital, utilization of idle 
resources... primarily through increased exports, 
and technological advancement.52
On the management of PEs, the plan stated that, 'For 
the purpose of mobilizing the investment resources to the 
utmost, the management of the enterprises owned or 
controlled by the government should be rationalized.'53 
The plan was not specific on how this was to be achieved, 
but noted that government enterprises had been 
'irresponsibly and irrationally managed and wasted huge 
amounts of public property.' The plan stated that these 
enterprises had been guilty of providing political funds 
to previous governments and of 'rampant nepotism'.
The February 1964 revision of the plan was much more 
specific in stating that 'the investment resources for 
the expansion of such government-run or controlled 
projects as the railways, communications and electricity 
must be financed within the relevant corporations 
themselves by means of management rationalization and the 
upward adjustment of public utility charges'.54 Public 
utilities and other PEs had previously been forced to 
hold down their prices on the grounds that their 
increases would result in upward adjustments of other 
prices, ignoring the inflationary effect of this policy
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on the government budget and money supply.
The plan also called for more extensive use of 
banking institutions, and subsequent measures to improve 
banking institutions was undertaken. The Medium and Small 
Industry Bank was established in 1961, and two separate 
institutions, the Agricultural Bank and the Farm 
Cooperatives Association, were merged into a single 
organization, the National Agricultural Cooperative 
Federation. This latter move meant that the roughly
17,000 local cooperative offices throughout the country 
also became bank offices. In February 1962 the National 
Citizens Bank was founded by consolidating the 'mujin' 
(private money market savings and loan associations) in 
order to create a modernized bank to accept deposits from 
and make loans to lower and middle-income households and 
small retail and other businesses.55
Economic Decision-making
Given the Park Government's strong commitment to the 
achievement of economic development, the bureaucracy 
provided all possible administrative measures to 
implement plans. With the President at the helm, the 
administration dominated the legislative and judiciary 
branches as far as economic development was concerned. 
Economic policies were given top priority under this 
bureaucratic arrangement. The well-disciplined
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technocratic and bureaucratic elites in the state
apparatus carried out policies with strong administrative 
power. Song aptly describes the situation at that time:
In the 1960s many government offices, including 
the economic ministries, were staffed by retired 
army generals and colonels. Because the President 
himself was a retired army general, Korea's 
economic decision-making process was very close to 
a 'General Headquarters' style, in which the
President himself made all major decisions and 
settled policy disputes among his senior officials. 
Many Koreans complained that Korean economic policy
in the 1960s was managed by command.56
The highly centralized decision-making process 
obviously facilitated speed and flexibility in policy 
formulation with some advantages and some disadvantages. 
One example of how the process worked is provided by the 
Korean reaction to the oil crisis of October 1973. It 
required perhaps more than a month for the full 
implications of the situation to sink in but the 
president's secretariat began an intensive effort to 
produce a policy response. After consultation with a 
minimum number of experts, a sophisticated document was 
produced that led to a presidential emergency decree 
issued in January 1974, about three weeks after the study 
began. This became the centrepiece of energy policy.57 
Speedy decision-making also has its costs. Major adverse 
effects or better alternatives are often found after a 
new policy had been announced.
Thus the government took a leading role in mapping 
out the general direction of the economy in the form of
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five-year plans, but their actual implementation could 
not but be left to a mixed bag of public and private 
enterprises. It is obvious that the PEs were more 
responsive to the command of the government in the 
execution of the plans. The Park Government, however, 
showed no hesitation in devising means to influence 
enterprises even in the private sector. In 1962, for 
example, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry began 
setting annual export targets classified by commodity, 
region, and country of destination and monitored the 
performance of firms in approaching these targets. The 
government established or expanded a variety of special- 
purpose public enterprises to support this end. The best 
known of these is the Korea Trade Promotion Corporation.
The pattern of government-business relationships 
under Park was set in the first few months of the 
government when it announced a plan to confiscate 
fortunes from the so-called illicit fortune makers and 
implemented a special law for dealing with this. Under 
its provisions many of the country's leading businessmen 
were arrested and threatened with confiscation of their 
assets. Soon thereafter, ten of the leaders were summoned 
to a meeting with Park. A deal was struck whereby the 
government would exempt most businessmen from criminal 
prosecution; with the notable exception of commercial 
bank shares, existing assets would not be confiscated and
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businessmen would instead pay off their assessed 
obligations by establishing new basic industrial firms 
and donating a share to the government.
In the event, few new firms were established, and 
most of the delinquents paid fines in cash. But Park was 
interested in more than punishment; he was eager to 
enlist business support for the growth policies of the 
new government. Since these early years, government- 
business relations have mellowed and the advice of 
business associations has been listened to. It was 
largely on the basis of business recommendations that the 
industrial port at Ulsan was established and an 
association that evolved into the Federation of Korean 
Industries was created. Still, in this relationship, the 
government clearly had the whip hand.58
Although the relations of government and business 
were probably closer in export promotion than in other 
areas, the government's hand has been felt in all 
activities of large-scale enterprise. The most potent 
instruments for implementing economic policy have 
undoubtedly been control of bank credit and access to 
foreign borrowers. These instruments involve the 
manipulation of incentives on a presumably non- 
discriminatory basis but, in fact, involve a considerable 
element of administrative discretion.
Credit is the lifeblood of business enterprise
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everywhere, but it is particularly critical in Korea 
where the debt-equity ratios in manufacturing had been in 
the range of three or four to one in the first half of 
the 1970s. Over the entire period from 1963 to 1974, only 
14 percent of cash flows of manufacturing corporations 
came from new equity. Another 20 percent was generated 
internally, but two-thirds came from borrowing. Of the 
borrowing, 53 percent came from domestic banks and 
financial institutions, 29 percent from foreign sources, 
and 19 percent from miscellaneous sources, including 
unofficial money markets.59
Since the commercial banks and other financial 
institutions that undertake corporate financing are PEs, 
the heavy borrowing of Korean companies gives the 
government and PEs substantial influence over the private 
sector. This influence became even greater because 
borrowing from abroad can only be undertaken with 
government authorization.
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CHAPTER IV
THE CONTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES TO KOREA'S
ECONOMIC GROWTH
Of the many factors that have contributed to Korea's 
economic development, one cannot underestimate the role 
of the PE sector. The late President Park was the 
principal architect of this pattern of development. The 
Park Government's strong commitment to economic growth 
resulted in more active state involvement in the economic 
field. The economic policy was essentially pragmatic in 
the sense that the choice of means was determined by the 
ends to be achieved without significant ideological 
predilection. One indication is the degree of dependence 
on PE in an economy that proclaims the virtues of private 
initiative and the free market. The PE sector produced 9 
percent of GDP or 13 percent of non-agricultural GDP in 
1972. This is a rather high level, being similar to that 
of India on the basis of non-agricultural GDP and larger 
than that of Italy or the United Kingdom in the late 
1960s despite substantial socialist advocacy in all three 
countries at that time.
Knowledgeable observers are prone to explain the 
large PE sector in terms of the Japanese colonial 
heritage. At best this is a partial truth. The sector
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grew in absolute and relative terms during the rapid 
growth period from the early 1960s. Of the 36 enterprises 
in the sector as of the end of 1960, over three-quarters 
were directly traceable to activities run by the Japanese 
colonial government or confiscated from private Japanese 
firms. The number of PEs increased to more than 120 in 
1979. The expansion of PEs after the sixties was response 
to the inherent characteristics of economic development 
in Korea.
The average annual growth rate of value added in the 
PE sector was 14.5 percent as against 9.5 percent for the 
economy as a whole and 12.2 percent for the non- 
agricultural economy from 1963 to 1972.1 The new PEs 
established under the Park Government accounted for most 
of the increase in the relative size of the sector. It is 
thus misleading to view the current size of the sector as 
a passive residue of the colonial era. The sector's share 
of GDP value added and its origin is shown in Table 4-1. 
It should be noted that the sector's GDP and non- 
agricultural GDP share rose to 10.4 percent and 11.9 
percent respectively in 1986.
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Table 4-1 PEs' Value Added as Percentage of GDP
1963 1970 1977
(1) As % of GDP 6.7 9.2 8.0
(2) As % of non-agr. GDP 12.4 13.0 10.6
(3) Origin by sector
Agr. & Fishing 1.8 1.2 0
Mining 8.8 3.0 3.2
Manufacturing 30.2 39.2 39.5
Electricity & Gas 12.3 13.8 17.5
Construction 1.8 2.2 3.9
Wholesale & Retail 3.0 1.6 0.9
Transportation & Storage 26.5 21.6 14.5
Banking & Insurance 15.4 16.2 18.1
Public Utlties & Service 0.2 1.2 2.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: KDI, Han'auk kaebal vonqu [The Korea Development 
Review], vol.3, no.l, 1981.
In comparison, however, these figures are 
considerably lower than those for Taiwan and Brazil, 
where the government has engaged more deeply in the 
public sector. For example, Taiwanese PEs generated 22.1 
percent of GDP in 1976; Brazilian PEs yielded 20 percent 
of the net worth of the entire manufacturing sector in 
1974.2 The state played a much stronger entrepreneurial 
role in Taiwan and Brazil than in Korea.
The contribution of the PE sector to growth is not 
measured simply by the level of output but also by 
strategic importance. The areas of activity in the sector
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are more comprehensively illustrated in Table 4-2. Of the 
10 categories, the sector was an important factor in 
five. It accounted for seven-eighths of value added in 
finance; for two-thirds of electricity, water, and 
sanitation; for slightly less than one-third both in 
mining and in transport and communications; and for 15 
percent of manufacturing. Although a large number of PEs 
are engaged in providing physical facilities, most of the 
actual work is contracted out so that the sector 
accounted for only 5 percent of value added in 
construction. In terms of absolute size, the 
manufacturing sector accounted for one-third of PE value 
added, with finance, transport and communications each 
contributing a fifth, and electricity a further 14 
percent.
*
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Table 4-2 Industrial Origin of PE Value Added, 1972
Share of PE 
in
Industry
(%)
Share of 
Industry 
in PE 
Total (%)
Agriculture, Forestry, & 
Fishing
0.20 0.68
Mining 31.01 3.63
Manufacturing 15.11 34.92
Construction 5.44 2.98
Electricity, Water, & 
Sanitation
66.19 13.66
Transport & Communications 30.51 18.95
Trade 2.35 4.10
Finance 86.95 19.28
Ownership of Dwellings 0.40 0.09
Services 1.70 1.72
TOTAL 9.07 100.01
Source: L.P. Jones, Public Enterprise. 1975, p.76.
The above discussion suggests that the Korean PE 
sector achieved a remarkable growth during the 1960s and 
1970s and this was made in the country's strategically 
important areas. In order to further analyze the sector's 
role in credit rationing, infrastructure and the 
development of heavy industries, it will be useful to 
look at some economic characteristics and intervention 
motives of the sector.
1. Some Economic Characteristics and Intervention Motives
100
The structural role may be further analyzed by 
looking at some economic characteristics of the sector. 
Firstly, the issue of production interdependence is worth 
mentioning. PEs in general have high production 
interdependence or externalities. This factor of 
externalities is one of the main reasons for governments 
to undertake PEs, even when some of them do not show any 
surpluses.3 The full contribution of such sectors can be 
calculated when their role in stimulating other economic 
activities is considered. In other words, we should try 
to find out what the influence of an industry or a 
particular sector on the growth of the economy is, and, 
if such calculations are possible, the sector under 
consideration should have a multiplier effect on the 
growth of the economy. One of the tools that can enhance 
such an understanding and also provide some measure of 
the role of a particular sector in the economy is 
production interdependence.
The economy functions as a interdependent chain 
system of industries in that an output of industry A can 
be used as an input of industry B, whose output can again 
be used as an input of industry C. The more sophisticated 
the economy, the deeper will be the industrial 
interdependency. Industrial interdependency can be 
measured by the Chenery-Watanabe method. Input
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interdependence is defined as the ratio of total 
intermediate goods purchased to the total output 
produced. In the same manner, output interdependence is 
defined as the ratio of total intermediate goods sold to 
total output. Here only the direct effect is counted.4
The production interdependence measured by the 
Chenery-Watanabe method is deficient in not considering 
the indirect effect and in not distinguishing domestic 
effects from those operating on foreign economies. To 
overcome these defects, Jones suggests the calculation of 
both forward and backward linkage effects. In his method, 
output interdependence and input interdependence are 
substituted by forward linkage and backward linkage 
respectively. The production interdependence 
relationships for the Korean economy and the PE sector in 
1971 and 1975 are summarized in Figure 4-1, using the 
Chenery-Watanabe method. The PE sector in both years 
shows a higher input and output interdependence compared 
to that of the Korean economy as a whole or the non- 
agricultural economy. The PE manufacturing sector in both 
years demonstrates about the same degree of input 
interdependence but a much higher output interdependence. 
This means that the sector is more oriented towards 
accommodating other industries with its outputs. One 
other aspect noticeable from the figure is that the 
sector became more interdependent in both output and
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input markets in 1975. This partly reflects the fact that 
the Korean economy experienced a rapid structural 
transformation during the sample period.
Figure 4-1 PE Sector's Interdependence in Production
(Intermediate Sales / Total Value of Sales)
8
Mew PE (*7i)
PE Mfg-Monopoly (’71) 
(*75) "■
7
PE Sector (’71)
Old Monopoly ('71)
6
Old PE ('71)
Non-Agr Korea (' 71
5
Korean Econony ('71)
86 73 4 5
Note: new public enterprise means one established since 
1961.
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Source: I. Sakong, 'Macroeconomic Aspects of The Public 
Enterprise Sector' in C.K. Park (ed), Macroeconomic and 
Industrial Development in Korea (Seoul: Korea Development 
Institute, 1980), p.110.
Thus, industries with high production interdependence 
may have a greater adverse impact on other productive 
sectors. But, since PE goods and services are usually 
priced to cover costs and yield a profit in Korea, the 
private enterprises purchasing these goods and services 
are not indirectly subsidized, as frequently happens in 
other economies with a large PE sector.
This point needs some explanation with regard to a 
fiscal policy change in the early years of the Park 
Government. Between 1962 and 1964 government spending was 
cut from 25 percent of GNP to only 11 percent in order to 
eliminate government deficits. Efforts to increase tax 
revenues in order to permit higher levels of government 
investment and spending within the limits of a balanced 
budget raised the constant price value of tax revenues by 
an average 25 percent per year between 1965 and 1971. 
Government saving had risen from minus 2 percent to plus 
7 percent of GNP.5 Prices of government enterprises were 
raised in the face of inflationary pressures in order to 
increase enterprise profits and savings. Internal savings 
were soon the major source for greatly increased levels 
of investment of these enterprises, compared with little 
or no profits and relatively little new investment in
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immediately prior years.
During the 1960s, the savings (profits plus 
depreciation) of the government enterprises 
(departmental) and Government-Invested Enterprises (GIEs) 
amounted to more than two-thirds of their own gross 
investment, with the remainder financed mostly from 
general government budget sources and by bank credit. 
Thus, these enterprises had financed from their own 
revenues most of the capital formation.6 Although the 
savings of the PE sector as a proportion of their capital 
formation dropped in the 1980s,7 this was in marked 
contrast with the experience of a number of countries 
where at least some PEs operate at substantial deficits, 
where significant sums of general government revenues 
must be used just to meet these deficits, and where new 
investment must be financed by yet larger government 
expenditure and by borrowing from the private sector.
The sector's second economic characteristic is 
capital intensity. The sector is more than three times as 
capital intensive as the Korean economy, and more than 
double Korean manufacturing. This means the sector tends 
to absorb a large fraction of total investment and a 
small fraction of total employment. In the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, the sector accounted for about 30 percent of 
total investment but only 5 or 6 percent of the increase 
in employment.
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The third characteristic is output market 
concentration. In 1972, 76 percent of PE value added was 
in monopolistic or oligopolistic markets. At most, 10 
percent of the value added by the sector was sold in 
reasonably competitive markets. This is confirmed in 
terms of the number of monopolistic PEs in 1987. Table 4- 
3 shows that all of the Government Enterprises 
(departmental) , and more than 80 percent of GIEs and 
Subsidiary Companies of GIEs are monopolistic. Given this 
high correlation between PE and imperfect competition, 
what is the direction of causation? One possibility is 
that government uses its powers to protect its 
enterprises from competitive pressures. This is clearly 
the case with the Korea Monopoly Corporation, where the 
goal is straightforward revenue maximization. In 
virtually all other cases, however, enterprises may be 
interpreted to be in the public sector because they 
operated in imperfect markets rather than vice-versa.
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Table 4-3 Degree of Monopoly in the PE sector, 1987
Total
Number
(A)
Monopol
istic
(B)
% Ratio 
(B/A)
Government Enterprises 4 4 100.0
GIEs 26 21 80.8
Other Government-Backed 
Enterprises
6 5 83.3
Subsidiary Companies of 
GIEs
68 30 44.1
Local PEs 119 84 70.6
Total 223 144 64.6
Source: D.H. Song, Han'auk ui konqaioo kwanri choncrch'aek 
[Public Enterprise Management Policy in Korea] (Seoul: 
Korea Development Institute, 1989), p.107.
Finally, public sector enterprises are generally 
import substituting. Direct and indirect sectoral imports 
substantially exceeded direct and indirect exports, 
yielding a sectoral trade deficit representing 11.7 
percent of that of the economy as a whole. In sum, 
enterprises operating in the PE sector are characterized 
by high output interdependence, high capital intensity, 
large size, market concentration, and the production of 
import substitutes rather than exports.8
Given the characteristics of the enterprises in the 
public sector, the government's decision to intervene is 
not surprising. The degree of output market concentration 
alone would justify the intervention. The size of the
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sector is largely explicable as a pragmatic government's 
response to the various market imperfections that are 
virtually synonymous with low levels of economic 
development. Historical inertia and political 
predilection did affect the outcome, but to a lesser 
extent than in other developing countries. Various 
intervention motives in the Korean PE sector were 
surveyed by Jones. Based on his study, a set of 
intervention motives is given in Table 4-4.
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Table 4-4 Intervention Motives, 1972
Motives
For­
ward
Link
-age
Back­
ward
Link­
age
Capit
-al
Inten
-sity
Share
value
Added
Basic Motives 0.42
- Natural Monopoly 2.13 1.59 15.64 0.34
- Collective 
Intermediates 1.07 1.82 1.54 0.04
- Merit goods 1.46 1.76 1.34 0.05
Developmental
Motives 0.25
- Enterprenrl 
support 1.82 1.29 0.65 0.06
- Enterprenrl 
substitution 2.27 1.59 8.28 0.11
- Managerial 
substitution 1.73 1.77 4.26 0.04
- Transitional 2.06 1.83 23.95 0.04
Other Motives 0.33
- Power & control 2.44 1.79 0.96 0.12
- Revenue 1.11 1.63 1.64 0.21
Source: L.P. Jones, Public Enterprise. 1975, p.147.
The table assigns each enterprise to a single primary 
intervention category. Three basic groups are 
distinguished. The first, termed 'basic motives' includes 
productive activities that provide public intervention in 
one form or another in virtually all economies. This 
group includes the natural monopolies and producers of 
collective intermediates and marketed merit goods. The
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second group, called 'developmental motives' includes 
reasons common to the developing economies. These all 
arise from a constellation of market failures involving 
entrepreneurial inadequacies, imperfect capital markets, 
shortages of information, and unwillingness to bear risk. 
The third group is a heterogeneous class of other motives 
including power, control, and revenue. Basic motives 
accounted for 42 percent of 1972 PE value added, 
developmental motives for 25 percent, and other motives 
for 33 percent.
A look at individual categories reveals that natural 
monopolies are characterized by very high forward 
linkages, but modest backward linkages. They are related 
to development in that their expansion is necessary if 
bottlenecks are to be avoided. Collective intermediates 
and merit goods have very low forward linkages, modest 
backward linkages, and low capital intensity. Their 
provision is not directly related to economic growth, but 
rather a component of broader social development. The 
first two developmental motives deal with activities that 
are judged to be potentially profitable from a purely 
private point of view, but that the private sector will 
not undertake independently because of the magnitude of 
capital requirements, risk, uncertainty, technological 
complexity, lack of market knowledge, and so on. To 
compensate for this entrepreneurial failure, government
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may either provide technical assistance, or subsidized 
credit through entrepreneurial support organizations, or 
it may itself initiate the activity taking the role of 
entrepreneurial substitute. The third developmental 
category is termed 'managerial substitution'. It refers 
to cases where the private sector initiated actively, 
usually with the help of a supporting PE, but then failed 
in the operational phase resulting in a threat of 
bankruptcy.
It seems fair to say that the government did not seek 
to compete with the private sector, but rather to 
undertake new industrial investments only when necessary 
either to avoid creating a powerful private monopoly or 
to introduce a large-scale activity where private capital 
was not available or able to do the job, at least not 
without very large-scale government financial support.
The 'power and control' motive category is primarily 
composed of state-owned special banks and other financial 
intermediaries. A purely economic rationale for 
intervention in these entities' activities follows from 
the disequilibrium interest rate system, the 
opportunities for profit sharing, and the resultant 
necessity for close control over the temptations provided 
to bank officials.9 A much more important reason, 
however, is a desire by the Park Government to control 
private concentrations of economic power. Control of the
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banks was a central element of the Japanese zaibatsu10 
power, and keeping the banks in public hands is a potent 
constraint on similar developments in Korea.
2. Financial Public Enterprises' Role; Credit Rationing
In Korea, the government's control of the financial 
system was an integral part of the government-led 
economic development. Korea's financial sector played a 
significant role in this development by mobilizing 
domestic savings for capital formation. Yet the more 
significant aspect of the banks' role during the decades 
of economic growth was to serve as the major source of 
government-directed loans to Korean businesses, thereby 
giving the government a powerful means of control over 
the private sector.
Two major financial developments before 1961 deserve 
attention. The first was the privatization of commercial 
banks that had previously been nationalized in the 
process of divesting Japanese interests. The government 
shares of commercial banks were put on the block 
beginning in 1954 and on a massive scale in 1957. The 
auctions were conducted in such a fashion that the result 
was the high concentration of stock in a few hands. The 
second development worthy of mention was the 
establishment in 1959 of the Bank of Seoul as a bank
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exclusively funded with private capital. The Bank of 
Seoul was the first new entry into commercial banking 
since liberation.
As Park came to power in 1961, the strengthened 
control of the government over the financial sector is 
most evident in its relationship to the central bank and 
the Monetary Board. In May 1962, the Bank of Korea Act 
was amended and the Board was renamed the Monetary 
Management Board. This titular change was interpreted as 
an expression of the government's intention to downgrade 
the function of the board from policy deliberation to 
policy management discussion.11 At the same time, the 
Board's membership was expanded to nine by adding two 
appointed members to the existing seven. The power of the 
Finance Minister was strengthened; the Minister could 
request that the Board reconsider a resolution previously 
passed. If the request was overruled by the Board with a 
two-thirds majority, the final decision would be made at 
a cabinet meeting, at which the Minister's view would be 
ensured a hearing. As final proof of its subordination, 
the central bank was made subject to examination by the 
Finance Minister at least once a year, and its annual 
budget was to be approved by the cabinet.
In addition, those commercial banks privatized in the 
late 1950s were once again nationalized as a result of 
confiscating 'illicit' wealth accumulated under the
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previous regime immediately after the military coup. 
Furthermore, the voting rights of private shareholders 
were restricted to a maximum 10 percent by the
Provisional Law on Financial Institutions. The annual 
budgets of commercial banks were made subject to the 
approval of the Finance Minister, although there was 
neither binding stature nor legislated rule to that 
effect. The case was the same with the top management of 
commercial banks.12 Their organizational structures were 
made identical. In essence, the presence of the
government was felt in commercial banks almost to the 
same extent as in special banks and the role of banks was 
to be that of credit-rationing outlets at the command of 
the government.
Financial institutions in Korea can be classified 
into the central bank (Bank of Korea) and two other broad 
categories - banking institutions and non-bank financial 
institutions. Non-bank financial institutions were 
insignificant until the mid-1970s. Banking institutions 
comprise commercial banks and specialized banks. The 
former category is composed of 7 nationwide banks, 10
local banks, and 55 foreign bank branches (as of the end
of 1987) ; the latter includes the Korea Exchange Bank, 
the Small and Medium Industry Bank, the Citizen's 
National Bank, the Korea Housing Bank, the National 
Agricultural Cooperatives Federation, the National
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Federation of Fisheries Cooperatives, and the National 
Livestock Cooperatives Federation. The Korea Development 
Bank, the Export-Import Bank of Korea, and the Korea 
Long-Term Credit Bank are also specialized banks, in that 
they were established under special laws, but they are 
classified functionally as non-banks, because their 
primary source of funds is not deposits but issuance of 
debentures, borrowing, and so on.
A significant role in financing industrialization was 
played by the special banks. They were established mostly 
during the 1960s in order to provide intermediate and 
long-term credit to meet the demands for funds from key 
industries or strategic sectors which commercial banks 
alone could not adequately supply. As PEs they are owned, 
directed, and supervised by the government and, in 
principle, are outside the purview of the Monetary Board.
The Korea Development Bank was founded in 1954 to 
supply long-term credit for key industries. In the latter 
half of the 1950s the bank contributed to the 
rehabilitation of industrial facilities destroyed during 
the Korean War. The bank was reoriented to finance major 
development projects in line with the First Five-Year 
Economic Development Plan. The Small and Medium Industry 
Bank was established in 1961 to reinforce financial 
support for small and medium-sized firms. A number of 
mutual finance companies were consolidated into the
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Citizen's National Bank of Korea in 1962; a year later 
this was reorganized as the Citizen's National Bank. This 
bank was to specialize in small loans to small-sized 
firms with poor credit standing as well as to households. 
The National Agricultural Cooperative Federation was 
reorganized in 1961 via the merger of the former 
Agricultural Cooperatives and the Agriculture Bank. 
Similarly, the National Federation of Fisheries 
Cooperatives was established in 1962 to meet the 
financial needs of fishers and fisheries manufacturers.
The hectic year for establishing specialized banks 
was 1967. Firstly, the Korea Exchange Bank was 
established with the specific task of supporting foreign 
exchange transactions for firms. The need for a bank 
specializing in this field had increased with the rapid 
growth of foreign trade volume. Secondly, the Korea 
Housing Bank was founded to finance housing for low- 
income households. A third bank established in 1967 was 
the Korea Long Term Credit Bank (reorganized from the 
Korea Development Finance Corporation). It was empowered 
to extend medium and long-term credit to firms in the 
form of loans, discounts, equity investments, and 
guarantees. This bank is unique, in that it is a 
privately funded institution with specialized functions 
assigned to it. Booming exports necessitated the 
inauguration of the Export-Import Bank of Korea in 1969,
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with its capital funded by the government, the Bank of 
Korea, and the Korea Exchange Bank. Its main business is 
financing medium and long-term export-import 
transactions; investing overseas, including natural 
resources development projects abroad; underwriting 
export insurance for domestic corporations and foreign 
institutions; and extending credit to foreign buyers for 
importing capital goods and technical services from 
Korea.
During the rapid developmental period, special banks 
played an important role in the Korean banking system. By 
1978, the special banks held 36.9 percent of assets, 30.6 
percent of deposits, and 42.5 percent of loans held by 
all domestic banks.13 Public ownership and control is 
dominant in banking institutions in Korea. Only local 
banks and the branches of foreign banks are truly private 
and they account for only 15 percent of the total bank 
loans and discounts. Because of the voting right 
restriction of private shareholders, the government or 
quasi-government authorities, holding about 30 percent of 
the shares in each of the nationwide commercial banks, 
has little difficulty in running these banks as it 
wishes. The heavy involvement of the government in the 
banking and financial sector was designed to facilitate 
the management of the economy. Moreover, the Park 
Government viewed control over the allocation of credit,
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both domestic and foreign, as an important element of 
economic and political policy. It resisted repeated 
advice to let interest rates and competition among 
independent financial institutions determine the 
allocation of credit. It was also claimed that the system 
invited bribery and misallocation of resources. Instead, 
the government has kept loan interest rates below 
equilibrium levels and has intervened pervasively in 
allocation decisions.
The Park Government used the financial system to 
provide incentives to exporters and to support those 
investments considered most conducive to 
industrialization. Exporters received automatic financing 
of raw material and production costs at low interest 
rates around 6 percent per annum. This financing, which 
often exceeded current needs, could be reloaned in part 
in the unauthorized money markets at 24-30 percent per 
annum, thus giving a healthy subsidy. Similarly, the 
foreign loans and even many of the loans of commercial 
banks carried interest rates that were low in nominal 
terms and often negative in real terms.14
The reasons for this were both economic and 
political: the credit instruments could be used to
mobilize businessmen for major economic programmes such 
as export promotion or the development of the machinery 
and petrochemical industries, while on the political side
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they served to maintain control over, and cooperation 
from, the business community. Most of the Korean 
businessmen might have been aware of the need to stay on 
good terms with the government to assure continuing 
access to credit and to avoid harassment from the tax 
officials. Although the state banks had not acquired any 
greater degree of independence in decision-making as to 
the allocation of credit, since decisions on all the 
guarantees and many of the larger loans were made by the 
government, they did at least have a greatly expanded 
managerial role over a system that exerted a major 
influence on the allocation of resources.
3. Infrastructure Development
In pursuing an outward-looking development policy, 
the initial difficulty facing the Park Government was 
mobilizing capital for financing industrialization. A 
large reserve of labour force with relatively good 
education and skills could provide a base for the 
establishment of labour-intensive industries, but an 
acute shortage of capital was a major obstacle to that 
approach.15 By 1963, neither the public sector nor the 
private sector was generating an investment surplus 
enough to finance new projects and industries. The 
national economy of Korea was dominated by US foreign
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aid, which financed more than 50 percent of total fixed 
capital formation in 1964 and 1965. The government had to 
seek foreign investment prior to generating domestic 
ability to mobilize capital.
The dependence of Korea's industrialization on 
foreign capital had been extremely high. During the first 
two Five-Year Economic Plans, for instance, foreign 
savings accounted for almost half of the total investment 
of Korea. The percentage began to drop in the early 1970s 
and the character of external capital changed rapidly, 
with major sources of capital shifting from grants to 
loans, from official to commercial loans, and from loans 
to direct investments.16 Japanese capital, however, came 
to make up for the gradual reduction in American aid to 
Korea. The controversial Korea-Japan treaty of 1965 
established a basic framework for the influx of Japanese 
capital. This resumption of diplomatic ties with Japan 
signalled the increasing influence of a Japanese role, in 
addition to the American role, in shaping the 
industrialization of Korea. Thus the US and Japan became 
the two dominant capitalist centres for Korea in its 
relations with the international economic and political 
system. During the phase of Korea's outward-looking 
development, these countries were the two principal 
capital suppliers and the trading partners. Their 
combined share was more than 48 percent in total capital
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inducement between 1962 and 1979 (Table 4-5). The US and 
Japanese security commitment also produced a favourable 
investment climate in Korea for international financial 
institutions.17
Table 4-5 Foreign Loans and Investment, 1962-79 (million 
US$)
Public
Loan
Commer­
cial
Loan
Direct
Invest
-ment
Total
USA 1,687 2,291 222 4,200
Japan 929 2,148 588 3,665
International
Institutions
2,427 81 0 2,508
EC 506 2,843 146 3,495
Others 300 2,004 117 2,421
Total 5,849 9,367 1,073 16,289
Source: Economic Planning Board, Current Status of
Foreign Capital Inducement. 1980.
In inducing foreign capital, the government gave 
priority to indirect over direct investment. Given the 
assumption that multinational activities would be 
disruptive to the nationalistic logic of capital 
accumulation, the state tried to exercise control over 
foreign presence by favouring loans over direct 
investment, since loans do not entail foreign control of 
the local firms. The government was reluctant to
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cooperate with multinationals until local industries 
reached a competitive stance in technological and capital 
capabilities vis-a-vis multinationals. It exercised its 
central role in the management of the economy by 
mandating a preferred role for foreign investment in the 
form of loans. Among the total of $16.2 billion of 
foreign investment between 1962 and 1979, the amount of 
public and commercial loans accounted for about 15 times 
that of direct investment.
There is little doubt that foreign investment was 
essential to Korea's industrialization. It stimulated 
domestic capital formation and improved management skills 
for the domestic economy. Above all, acquiring import- 
embodied technology was an important by-product. It 
accelerated domestic substitution of goods previously 
imported. Since there was industrial infrastructure 
consisting of people with technical and management skills 
and facilitating industries, the capacity to utilize 
import-embodied know-how was relatively high. Although an 
empirical study of technology transfer is not available, 
the presence of significant technical progress in the 
growing manufacturing sector may have been attributable 
to the considerable diffusion and application of the 
import-embodied technology.18
It is worth noting that foreign capital, however, was 
heavily concentrated in social infrastructure
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development. Of the total foreign loans of 2,545 million 
dollars induced from 1962 to 1970, 44 percent were
allocated in social overhead capital.19 This was 
attributed to the public loans from international 
financial institutions for the agricultural sector and a 
significant increase in the electricity and 
transportation sector. This implies that the lion's share 
of foreign loans was directed to PEs.
The PE sector consistently played a substantial role 
in fixed capital formation. Above all, they were 
extensively utilized as developmental agents in various 
infrastructure projects during the initial period of 
development. The result was remarkable. Per capita 
consumption of electricity increased from 87 kilowatt- 
hours in 1965 to 471 kilowatt-hours in 1975. Korea 
started to develop its nuclear generating capacity in the 
early 1970s, and the first nuclear plant was completed in 
1977. The transport sector also grew rapidly. Freight and 
passenger traffic increased by about 12 to 13 percent a 
year in the 1965-75 period. Paved roads increased more 
than fivefold, and three-quarters of passenger traffic 
was by road. The share of the railways in freight and 
passenger traffic declined. Nevertheless about one-half 
of freight traffic, consisting mainly of long hauls of 
bulk commodities, still went by rail in 1975. Coastal 
shipping expanded rapidly between 1965 and 1970 and
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carried a stable volume of traffic after 1973. The cargo- 
handling capacity of well-developed ports, spaced at 
intervals of 200 kilometres or less along the coastline, 
rose from 15 million tons in 1967 to 31 million tons in 
1975. With the growth of foreign trade, the gross tonnage 
of Korea's ocean-going fleet rose from 163,000 in 1965 to 
2.2 million in 1975.20
Having been committed to rapid economic growth and 
modernization, it appeared quite natural to the military 
government that social infrastructure investment could 
spark an accelerated trend of private capital formation 
and output growth. For one, the military had managed 
transportation and communication facilities as well as a 
great deal of construction equipment since the outbreak 
of the Korean War; hence, the infrastructure sectors were 
the areas with which they felt familiar and expected to 
exercise direct control. Secondly, the lack of adequate 
social infrastructure such as power, transportation and 
communication facilities was thought to cause one of the 
serious bottlenecks to the future development of the 
economy. Furthermore, the growth of infrastructure 
facilities was believed to create new investment and 
sales opportunities for private business. In the 
framework of the usual multiplier-accelerator mechanism, 
it meant an injection of autonomous investment, 
spearheaded by the public sector, calling for magnified
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increases in the level of output and induced 
investment.21 For this purpose, several new firms such as 
Korea Highway Corporation, and Korea Water Resources 
Development Corporation were added to the PE sector. 
Consequently, massive investments in electricity, gas, 
railways, highways and irrigation were made.
Over the 1962 to 1973 period, PEs generated slightly 
more than 10 percent of savings while absorbing about 30 
percent of investment. In the years 1963-69, social 
overhead investment, including transportation, 
communications, construction, and public utilities, 
expanded at an annual average rate of 28 percent. Table 
4-6 shows the PE sector's share of fixed capital 
formation in selected years since 1963.
Table 4-6 Sectoral Composition of Fixed Capital Formation
1963 1970 1975 1980
PEs 31.7 18.9 33.2 27.6
Government 9.5 19.1 11.6 7.0
Incorprtd Busins 32.0 42.2 31.9 41.5
Individuals 26.8 19.8 23.3 23.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Bank of Korea, Flow of Funds Accounts in Korea, 
each year.
As seen in the table, the PE sector consistently 
played a substantial role in fixed capital formation.
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During the period from 1970 to 1975, a yearly average of 
27.9 percent of the total national fixed capital 
formation was attributable to the sector.22 Considering 
the sector's less than 10 percent GDP share and low level 
of savings (8.1 % of over-all gross savings, 1970-75), 
this shows the strategic importance of PEs as fixed 
investment agents.
4. Pioneering Heavy and Chemical Industries
Korea's export expansion strategy contributed 
significantly to the overall expansion of the economy. An 
estimate shows that export growth accounted for less than 
10 percent of real GNP growth before 1960. Its 
contribution rose during the 1960s, reaching over 20 
percent in the first half of the 1970s. By the latter 
half of that decade, about a third of national growth 
could be attributed to the expansion of exports. 
Exporting activities also contributed to the growth of 
technological capabilities. This reflects the positive 
effects of foreign competitive pressure on productivity 
and the fact that trade creates new channels for learning 
about and acquiring foreign technologies. The spectacular 
export performance led to increasing confidence in the 
Government's ability to initiate and direct national 
development strategy. Certainly the takeoff period
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demonstrated that a favourable macroeconomic framework, 
combined with aggressive export-prompting intervention 
could lead to rapid growth. Buoyed by its past success, 
the Government next turned to more direct efforts to 
accelerate structural change in order to promote heavy 
and chemical industries (HCIs)
Despite intervention, there was little sectoral bias 
in the government's development strategy prior to the 
early 1970s. Although special laws promoting machinery 
and shipbuilding were adopted in 1967, and basic 
materials and intermediate goods were frequently 
mentioned as an objective, the First and Second Five- 
Year Plans identified labour-intensive exports as a high 
priority and the export imperative generally dominated 
government policy. The shift from general export 
promotion to a sectoral development strategy, focused on 
HCIs, was announced in 1973 by the late President Park.
This represented a major industrial policy change in 
favour of specific industrial targets and wide-ranging 
commitment by the government. This policy change had both 
political and economic roots. The opening of US relations 
with China and the fear of a possible withdrawal of 
American troops prompted the government to seek an 
industrial base for an independent defence effort. On the 
economic side, the objective of 'deepening industrial 
structure' was seen as a logical response to the rapidly
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rising domestic wage rate and increased global 
competition in some of Korea's export industries. The 
potential entry of China in world markets appeared to 
accelerate these trends. At the same time, Japanese 
penetration of global steel, electronics, and automobile 
markets provided a timely and successful model. Indeed, 
the government believed that the industrial structure 
needed upgrading and that the new directions required 
large-scale risky investments which would not be 
undertaken by private firms without decisive state 
initiative.24
The targeted industries included steel, machinery, 
shipbuilding, petrochemicals, and automobile production. 
These industries were to capture a substantially larger 
share of value added as well as account for more than 50 
percent of Korean exports by 1980.
However, well before the HCI drive policy was 
announced, PEs were active in most of these industries. 
The strongest presence was in chemicals and steel. In the 
initial period, the government preferred to control such 
industries directly, bearing the risk of innovative 
investments. As these industries became better 
established and there was room for several enterprises, 
the government opened the way to private investors. One 
example of this sequence is found in fertilizers, where 
the state-owned Chungju Fertilizer Company made the
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initial investment. This costly facility took over 5 
years to construct and to be put into effective 
operation. After a second state-owned plant was built, 
the government drew upon the experienced staffs of these 
two enterprises to establish two new joint ventures 
involving state-owned companies and foreign companies. 
Finally, a wholly private, domestic, and foreign joint 
venture was allowed to build the fifth fertilizer plant. 
This trend toward private investment was repeated in 
petroleum refining.25
Under the Rhee Government, refined oil was simply 
imported and there was little more than loose talk of the 
need for a refinery. At last one was completed in 1964, 
a few years after Park came to power. Located in the 
Ulsan estate, it was operated by the Korea Oil 
Corporation, a joint venture between the government and 
Gulf Oil. As demand grew, it was repeatedly expanded. 
Then, in 1969, a second refinery went on stream, a joint 
venture between Caltex and the Lucky Group called Honam. 
With demand growing further, Kyung In Energy was 
established by Union Oil and the Korea Explosives Group 
in 1971. In 1980, a fourth refinery was launched by the 
Ssangyong Group, with the National Iranian Oil Company.26
In 1972, state-owned fertilizer firms accounted for 
72.2%, refinery firms 48.4%, metals 16.7%, and steel 
firms 11.0% of the domestic production.27 Shipbuilding is
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one of the most rapidly developed HCIs since the 1970s. 
The PE sector also played a role in this industry since 
the state-owned Dae Han Shipbuilding Corporation took the 
lead in modern shipbuilding.
The Pohang Iron and Steel Company (POSCO), however, 
is the most appropriate example of PE's pioneering role 
in heavy industry. Korea faced several challenges in 
entering the steel business: integrated iron and steel- 
making is highly capital intensive, but she lacked 
capital. Costs are sensitive to scale, but Korea's 
domestic market was small and the largest nearby market, 
Japan, lodged the world's most efficient steel producer. 
Korea also lacked iron ore resources and steel-making 
skills. As is typical of many mature industries, the 
steel-making process is embodied in the equipment. Most 
of the technology can be imported from machinery 
suppliers and consultants. Nonetheless, the nature of the 
process necessitates complex engineering. The Park 
Government first tried to enter into steel-making in 
1961, then again in 1962 and 1967 by negotiating foreign 
financial sources. All efforts collapsed in disagreement 
over scale. Finally, finance was forthcoming in the form 
of reparations from the Japanese government for 'years of 
hardship under Japanese rule'. The engineering consultant 
to POSCO was designated the 'Japan Group' and consisted 
mainly of Nippon Steel and Nippon Kokkan Steel. At last,
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in 1968, the government established POSCO as a GIE with 
$3.6 billion,28 Korea's largest single investment until 
then; five years later POSCO began production in the 
southeast city of Pohang with an annual capacity of 1.03 
million metric tons. After several expansions, the 
integrated iron and steel mill reached an annual capacity 
of 9.1 million metric tons of crude steel in 1983 and 
with the completion of its third-phase expansion project 
for the Kwangyang plant in 1990, it became the third 
largest steel maker in the world. The latest expansion 
pushed up POSCO's annual production capacity to 17.5 
million tons, only behind Nippon Steel of Japan and 
Usinor Sacilor of France, and made Korea the sixth 
largest steel producing country in the world.29
About 20 years after its founding, POSCO became one 
of the lowest-cost steel-makers in the world.30 An 
indicator of its progress was a joint venture POSCO 
entered into with United States Steel in 1986 for the 
purpose of modernizing the latter's Pittsburg, California 
plant. POSCO was to supply half of the capital 
requirements, provide some facilities, undertake basic 
design and train the American managers and workers. As 
steel is increasingly demanded by industries such as 
shipbuilding, automobiles, and construction, the founding 
of POSCO signalled Korea's turn to heavy industry.31
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CHAPTER V
THE REFORM IN THE CONTROL SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT- 
INVESTED ENTERPRISES
Korea's rapid economic growth during the 1960s and 
1970s is attributable to the government's use of its 
close supervisory relationship with business to channel 
private endeavour in accordance with broader national 
industrial policy. During this period PEs were used as an 
administrative device and were subject to extensive 
control and direction, regardless of their legal or 
organizational form. After the government's aggressive 
industrialization policy during the 1960s and 1970s, the 
very success of the development had produced a complex 
economy with diverse international economic relations.
As a result, Korea faced formidable economic tasks. 
The structural and macroeconomic imbalances created by 
declining industries were aggravated by the second oil 
crisis in 1979 which raised Korea's oil bill from 5 
percent of GDP in 1978 to 10 percent in 1980. With the 
increasing sophistication of the economy and the 
continuing pressure of international competition, it was 
obvious that Korea was at a stage of development where 
its industries should be distanced from the government's 
direct influence.
In addition, when Korea increasingly sought to
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attract the more advanced commercial technologies, from 
electronics to pharmaceutical, there was trade partner 
criticism that elaborate controls on imports and foreign 
investment were no longer necessary to protect the 
domestic economy and were, in fact, hampering healthy 
trade. Foreign firms that had developed sophisticated 
proprietary technologies hesitated to enter Korea. This 
was due to doubts about the business environment in Korea 
that ranged from government-business relations to the 
adequacy of patent protection.1 These developments led to 
questioning of the long-term viability of close, finely 
tuned government guidance of economic affairs. Better to 
have the government step back a few paces and shift to a 
more open, market-oriented system was the advice heard 
from domestic and foreign experts.
The new Chun Government took power after the 
assassination of President Park, recognized that a new 
legal and policy framework was needed to streamline 
industrial policy and adopted a view that the degree of 
centralization in economic activities should be reduced 
through greater reliance on market mechanisms. This 
resulted in the adoption of a new approach in the 
Republic's Fifth Five-Year Economic Development Plan 
(1982-86). The World Bank reported:
The plan presented a new philosophy for 
economic management to adjust to a new situation. 
In the past, the government set detailed targets 
for macro-economic variables such as exports,
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investment and growth, and strongly influenced the 
direction of the economy through financial and 
fiscal policies, and occasionally by direct 
government intervention. The new emphasis is on 
defining basic policies rather than establishing 
macro-economic targets or detailed investment 
plans...
The priorities of economic planning have also 
been redesigned: In the earlier plans, growth was 
the top priority, equity a distant second and price 
stability a largely residual objective; in the 
fifth plan, price stability is the top priority, 
equity a close second and growth is to be based on 
improving the long-run efficiency and achieving 
price stability.2
In line with this, the privatization of PEs, the 
conversion of departmental agencies including the Offices 
of Monopoly and Communications into GIEs, and the more 
efficient management of PEs in general, were important 
concerns of the overall reform programme. In implementing 
this policy, it was debated over how far the government 
privatize PEs. The prevailed view on privatization in 
relation to the intervention motives discussed in Chapter 
4 is summarized as follows.3
For the first group of basic motives, natural 
monopolies are characterized by increasing returns to 
scale. The alternative to public operation is regulation 
and private monopoly. In addition, they are related to 
development in that their expansion is necessary if 
bottlenecks are to be avoided. Collective intermediates 
are rather a component of broader social development. As 
for merit goods, the alternative is subsidized private 
production. Hence, privatization is not regarded
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necessary or the best answer for this group. The 
developmental motives deal with activities that the 
private sector does not undertake independently because 
of the magnitude of capital requirements, risk, 
uncertainty, technological complexity, and so on. Hence 
their privatization should be decided on a case-by-case 
approach on the basis of such private entrepreneurial 
support and substitutability. For the power and control 
motive category, primarily composed of commercial banks 
and specialized banks, the private concentration of 
economic power which might be brought about by the 
privatization of banks can be prevented by avoiding 
ownership or control by a single interest group.
First of all, it was widely recognized that 
liberalization and reorganization of the financial 
structure were vital for the efficiency of the market- 
oriented economy. Between 1982 and 1983, therefore, the 
government divested itself of all nationwide commercial 
banks. In order to prevent ownership and control by a 
single interest group, however, restrictions were placed 
on maximum equity holding and voting rights. In line with 
this, two new joint venture banks were authorized and 
established in 1982. Competition in the financial sector 
was further encouraged by the licensing of 43 new mutual 
savings and finance companies, and 10 short-term finance 
companies in the same year.4 Along with this, two
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departmental PEs (cigarettes monopoly and 
telecommunications) were transformed into GIEs.
Recent privatization in Korea, however, cannot be 
considered as a straightforward success. Things were much 
more complicated than expected. The privatization of 
commercial banks, for instance, may be a necessary 
condition for the efficiency of the monetary market, but 
is definitely not a sufficient condition. The government 
has only slightly reduced its control over banks in 
practice, even after denationalization. Most of all, 
interest rate liberalization, an essential element of 
financial development, is not permitted by the 
government; there still exists an excessive fragmentation 
of interest rates. This fragmentation is reflected in the 
structure of the financial system since it has encouraged 
excessive specialization of institutions, thus reducing 
competition and efficiency. Legislated specialization of 
institutions was reinforced by detailed government 
regulation of financial activities, restrictions on new 
establishments, and by a supervisory system for enforcing 
these regulations which is itself excessively fragmented.
Furthermore, directed credits by the government have 
continued to grow and have often involved detailed 
earmarking of funds by the government down to the level 
of individual enterprises, so that the banks involved 
have operated more as a conduit for government funds than
139
as institutions with independent decision-making 
authority. In short, the recent privatization of 
commercial banks has done little to enhance competition 
and efficiency in financial markets in Korea, and 
government control has remained as effective as it was 
during the period prior to denationalization. The reasons 
for this are many, of which four will be cited.
Firstly, the heavy indebtedness of the corporate 
sector was the biggest constraint on full liberalization 
of interest rates. The liberalization of interest rates, 
which would have resulted in higher interest rates, was 
strongly opposed by the big corporations, which argued 
that higher interest rates would weaken international 
competitiveness and cause inflation by increasing 
production costs. Secondly, there exists a big gap 
between bank deposit rates administered by the government 
and the relatively freer secondary market yields on bonds 
and debentures. This has allowed higher rates to prevail 
in the non-banking segment and has encouraged a more 
rapid growth of these institutions within the financial 
system. These non-banking financial institutions have 
opposed the complete liberalization of interest rates and 
the introduction of a universal banking system on the 
basis that they would be wiped out in the face of 
competition from the larger commercial banks. Thirdly, 
the government itself perhaps had no true intention of
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giving up control of commercial banks completely. Lastly, 
there did not emerge any countervailing power within the 
commercial banks to stand up and fight for their autonomy 
and their own interests. Even after denationalization, 
the presidents and directors of commercial banks still 
show greater concern and 'courtesy' to the government 
than to their shareholders, and commercial bankers 
basically remain quasi-government officials rather than 
entrepreneurs or managers.
While the recent privatization of commercial banks is 
dubious in terms of effectiveness and performance, the 
privatization of other areas such as manufacturing and 
other services was quite successful. Privatized 
enterprises such as Korean Air Lines, Daewoo Heavy 
Industry, and Yukong Inc are a few good examples. All 
these enterprises are now considered to be operating more 
profitably and much more efficiently than they were under 
public control. This was possible because, above all, the 
government has totally given up any interference in their 
management, in contrast to the case of commercial banks.
By far the most important reform measures were 
initiated in order to enhance the efficiency of GIEs, 
which represent the core of the PEs; account for 44 
percent of employment, 52 percent of the total assets, 
and 44 percent of the sales of the whole PE sector. In 
1984, the combined budget of the GIEs amounted to 11,270
141
billion won, exceeding the general-account budget of the 
central government, whereas the total investment in GIEs 
represent 17 percent of gross domestic investment. GIEs 
are also major holders of domestic credit and external 
debts: at the end of 1983, they accounted for 24 percent 
and 56 percent of total external and domestic debentures, 
respectively.5 It was calculated that even a slight 
improvement in efficiency in GIEs could bring about 
substantial gains in the national economy. For example, 
a 5 percent improvement in the real efficiency of GIEs in 
Korea was estimated to free resources amounting to 1.7 
percent of GDP, or over one billion dollars in 1981.6 
Increased efficiency of GIEs therefore would bring much- 
needed relief to the key issues confronting Korea in the 
1980s: price stabilization, external debt reduction, and 
freeing an adequate amount of investment resources for 
the private sector. Therefore, the management system and 
practices of GIEs have great influence on the whole 
economy.
1. The Need for Reform
While the role of PEs has been impressive during the 
rapid growth period and their performance compared 
favourably with that of the PE sectors of most other 
developing countries, it was not up to the expected
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level. As analyzed in Chapter 4, the production 
interdependence of Korean PEs is very high in both ways, 
forwardly and backwardly. Therefore, any managerial 
inefficiency in the sector could lead to a spill-over 
inefficiency of other industries which use the output of 
the inefficient PE. Any managerial issues or problems 
should be analyzed and solved not only for the PE per se 
but also for the other interdependent industries. It was 
generally believed that PEs are far less cost efficient 
than their private counterparts.
Table 5-1 Rate of Return to Capital of GIEs, 1982
All
Industries
GIEs
Normal Profit to Total Asset 27.5 7.8
Operating Profit to Business 
Capital
10.1 3.7
Source: Bank of Korea, Enterprises Management Analysis. 
1983
Table 5-1 shows the ratio of normal profit to total 
assets and that of operating profit to business capital. 
The normal profit to total asset ratio equals that of 
value added to total capital invested in the enterprise, 
where total capital includes operating business capital, 
investment capital and capital of construction-in- 
progress. In 1982, the normal profit to total asset ratio 
of GIEs was 7.8 percent, which is less than one third of
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27.5 percent, the average normal profit to total asset 
ratio for all industries. It also appeared that as total 
capital increases, the rate of return to the capital 
declines more rapidly in the PE sector than the private 
sector.7
Already in the late 1970s, the disappointing level of 
efficiency, together with the deteriorating financial 
situation of GIEs and their negative impact on the public 
sector gave rise to growing concern.8 The major problems 
underlying the poor management of GIEs are similar to 
those commonly found in other countries. These problems 
include the absence of both the accountability and 
autonomy of management, complicated budget processes, and 
inadequate personnel and incentive systems.
Until 1983, the fundamental principle of operational 
control of GIEs was that it was exercised by a 
corresponding minister. The minister in charge of a GIE 
was designated in the foundation law and the 
implementation decree thereof and had effective power to 
appoint the corporation's senior management. In addition 
the law usually makes explicit reference to the 
intervention powers of the government. According to the 
Korea Development Bank (KDB) Act:
The Governor shall be appointed by the 
President (of the Republic) upon the recommendation 
of the Minister of Finance; the Deputy Governor and 
Executive Directors shall be appointed by the 
Minister of Finance upon the recommendation of the 
Governor; and the Auditor shall be appointed by the
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Minister of Finance.
The KDB shall be supervised by the Minister of 
Finance... The Minister of Finance may give the KDB 
such orders concerning its business as are 
necessary...
The Minister of Finance may request the KDB to 
submit reports on such matters as are deemed 
necessary, or instruct a competent official of the 
said Ministry to examine the status of operations, 
books, records and other necessary matters of the 
KDB.9
The direction of PE control may fall somewhere 
between two extremes. Either all decisions are made at 
the enterprise level, thus ignoring the idea that PEs are 
useful means to achieve various social objectives; or 
numerous minor decisions are made or approved by the 
bureaucracy, thus making it difficult for the enterprise 
to react quickly to changing market and social 
conditions. The Korean case came closer to the second 
pole. It was argued that a rather tight control was 
justifiable because the government has to adjust the 
policies of GIEs to the course of the national economy.10 
However, there have been undoubtedly serious bureaucratic 
problems which make it difficult for managers to respond 
quickly to changing circumstances.
This problem was exacerbated by multiple controlling 
agencies. GIEs were responsible to a variety of 
ministries and agencies for a multitude of mundane 
details, and managers spent much of their time worrying 
about managing these bureaucratic relationships. One 
example of these counter-productive reporting practices
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is that an average GIE made 33 applications for approval 
and 37 reports to various ministries of the government in 
1982.
GIE budgets were authorized together with the central 
government budget before the reform in 1984. The problems 
with this budgeting system were lengthy procedures, 
duplicative government reviews and limited possibilities 
for GIE managers' manoeuvrability. According to the 
Government-Invested Enterprise Budget and Account Act:11
a. The Minister of the EPB is required to transmit a 
request for budgetary estimates to each enterprise by the 
end of June each year.
b. Each enterprise submits its budgetary estimates to the 
corresponding minister by August 31 for his review, and 
he in return submits the reviewed budgetary estimates to 
the Bureau of the Budget of the EPB. The budget bureau 
reviews these estimates and prepares the budget for GIEs 
for transmission to the State Council and the President. 
The final approval of GIEs' budget rests with the 
President of the Republic, instead of moving on to the 
legislature with the rest of the budget.
c. When the budget is approved by the President, the 
enterprise is notified of the decision by the minister of 
EPB and the Finance Minister. It is also required that 
each enterprise, at the beginning of each quarter, 
transmit quarterly reports for the previous quarter
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showing performance, income and expense to the ministers 
mentioned above.
The same law required that final accounts of GIEs 
were submitted to the MOF and then to the Board of Audit 
and Inspection (BAI). Later the legislature was required 
to approve the final closing of accounts, but this was of 
relatively minor importance. The BAI is responsible only 
to the President and empowered by law to audit GIEs in 
addition to the affairs of the central and local 
governments. GIEs had characteristically suffered from 
excessive audit and inspection; not only BAI but also the 
corresponding ministry, the Ministry of Finance and the 
Office of Supply exercised their power to carry out audit 
and inspection.
As a result, the inspections caused an enormous waste 
of manpower and time. The Korea Electric Power 
Corporation, for example, underwent 8 government 
inspections, lasting for a total of 108 days, in 1981. 
Moreover, these inspections focused on discovering 
violations of regulations. Such inspections induced the 
management to adopt rather undesirable management 
practices, in the hope of neutralizing the thrust of 
inspection.12
The government's grip on PEs' management could also 
be found in the appointment system. Public sector 
enterprises are often held to be inefficient because
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managers are constantly rotated and are appointed for 
political reasons rather than managerial skills. 
Professor Yu studied the social background of 357 top 
managers (Presidents, Vice Presidents, Directors, and 
Auditors) of 56 non-governmental PEs. He found that prior 
to joining the enterprises, the main occupation of 43 
percent had been military (21%) or civil service (22%). 
More importantly, this included at least two-thirds of 
all presidents and auditors as well as half the directors 
in the non-financial institutions.13
Appointments are generally for three years so that 
given a familiarization period and the natural lags in 
response to innovation, there is little opportunity for 
success to be recognized. Table 5-2 shows that, as of 
February 1984, more than 40 percent of GIE top managers 
had spent less than 3 years with the company and those 
who spent less than 1 year was as much as 13.4 percent.
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Table 5-2 Number of Top Managers by Staying Period
Financl
Sector
Non-
fnancial
Total
(Percentage)
Up to 1 Year 3 20 23 13.4)
1 to 2 Years - 27 27 15.7)
2 to 3 Years 5 14 19 11.0)
3 to 5 Years 1 33 34 19.8)
5 to 10 Years 2 5 7 4.1)
10 Years Plus 28 34 62 36.0)
Total 39 133 172 100.0)
Source: D.H. Song, Han/auk ui kongaiop kwanri chonach'aek 
[Public Enterprise Management Policy in Korea] (Seoul: 
Korea Development Institute, 1989) P.123.
Thus Korean PEs are, by and large, operated by ex- 
civil servants and ex-military officers rather than by 
professional managers; equivalent to political retirement 
programmes which have saddled enterprises with officers 
untrained in business skills.14 Since appointments are 
dominated by political considerations and pay is in no 
way related to performance, there are few incentives. PE 
managers are generally capable of carrying out a clear 
command, but the effective signals given by the control 
structure did not stimulate management efficiency.
2. The Government-Invested Enterprises Reform Measures
The idea of a new framework for PE management 
including a performance evaluation system was initiated
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by the Korea Development Institute (KDI), a government- 
sponsored policy research organization. Working closely 
with the EPB from 1982 to 1983, KDI formulated a proposal 
for improving the efficiency of GIEs. With the strong 
support of the Deputy Prime Minister, KDI undertook 
campaigns to mobilize the consensus of government, 
business and academic circles in favour of the reform.15 
As a result, the Government-Invested Enterprise 
Management Act and its implementation decree took effect 
in March 1984. The new act merged two existing laws; the 
Government-Invested Enterprise Administration Act, and 
the Government-Invested Enterprise Budget and Account 
Act.
The Management Act provided the general legal 
framework within which the GIEs operate. Once the Act 
became effective, the existing decrees needed to be 
revised to reflect the new Act's general philosophy and 
specific regulations. The Performance Evaluation Bureau 
in the EPB had been carrying out that task and by July 
1985, the Establishment Acts had been revised for 17 
GIEs. The principle of the autonomy of management was 
further reinforced in the revised individual decrees. 
Most of the references to 'priori approval' were deleted 
in the revised Establishment Acts.
The major features of the new law are: introduction 
of a two-tier management organization; provision of
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managerial autonomy through the reduction of government 
control over budgetary, personnel and procurement 
management; and implementation of an evaluation system 
with enlarged performance-related incentives.
A. Two-tier Board
The most notable change in the management structure 
under the new law is the separation of the executive and 
policy-making boards; upper board (Board of Directors) as 
a decision-making body took over some of corresponding 
ministry's previous power, and the lower board in charge 
of implementation chaired by the Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO). The upper board members are appointed by the 
corresponding minister on the recommendation of the 
chairman, while the chairman and CEO are appointed by the 
President of the Republic on the recommendation of the 
corresponding minister. All the members of the upper 
board including the chairman are to serve on a non­
permanent basis. Thus the independence of CEO and 
fairness of appointment have improved. The CEO now has 
the power to hire and fire subordinate executive officers 
without prior approval of supervising ministries and 
outsiders to the enterprise are no longer eligible for 
the lower board.16
B. Managerial Autonomy
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In an effort to rectify shortcomings from the lengthy 
and duplicative budgeting procedure, the new law grants 
authority to formulate and implement the budget to GIEs. 
The abolition of the GIE Budget and Account Act bars the 
government from reviewing and coordinating the GIE 
budgets. The government's main role consists in drafting 
common budget guide-lines issued by the Management 
Evaluation Council (MEC) - a newly established 
governmental supervising organization. Also, outside 
audits have been simplified. The new law designated the 
BAI as the only authorized inspection agency for GIEs. A 
corresponding ministry, however, may conduct inspection 
after consultation with BAI.
In the past, GIEs' big-scale procurement and 
contracts were handled by the Office of Supply, 
government's central procurement agency, which was blamed 
for overlapping procedure and delay. GIEs are now allowed 
to exercise their own discretion. They can either 
purchase directly or commission the Office of Supply to 
do so.17
3. The Performance Evaluation System
Korea's 'performance evaluation system', in 
management parlance, is an operations planning and 
control system. It involves specifying performance
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criteria for each PE, setting criterion values, defining 
gradations of performance around those criterion values, 
allocating weights to various criteria, evaluating actual 
performance at the end of the year, and, finally, paying 
an incentive bonus based on results. The so-called 
'signalling system' was first devised by L.P. Jones and 
has been implemented, with some modification, in Pakistan 
and Korea since 1983. The system attempts to make the 
evaluation process more transparent, reduce political 
interference, increase managerial autonomy, and at the 
same time render the enterprise and its management more 
accountable.
In its original design, the proposed criterion for 
measuring managerial performance is public profitability 
at constant prices. Public profitability is defined as 
the difference between production at factor cost minus 
intermediate inputs, employee compensation, rental 
expenses, plus net non-operating return, divided by 
revalued cost of capital. It is recognized that public 
profitability is a static measure of operating efficiency 
(i.e. it measures performance only in one period) which 
would fail to induce PE managers to incur expenditure on 
items whose benefits would only materialize in the 
future. To avoid this shortcoming, public profitability 
is supplemented by some dynamic indicators such as the 
production of suitable corporate plans, and expenditure
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on R&D and maintenance. The proposed criterion value 
(i.e. the yardstick measuring good or bad managerial 
performance) is based on a comparison of the performance 
of the enterprise in question in the current period 
versus its performance in previous periods. The proposed 
compensation system, is based on motivating managers to 
tell the truth about what they can do, then rewarding 
them for subsequently doing the best they can.18
The Korean system, however, turned out to be the most 
important innovation in the control of GIEs, by which a 
report and priori approval control was replaced with an 
objective-oriented ex-post evaluation scheme. The GIEs 
involved fall under about 10 different supervising 
ministries, all of which report to the Deputy Prime 
Minister, who also happens to be the Minister of EPB. The 
government agency primarily responsible for running the 
system is the Public Enterprise Evaluation Bureau, headed 
by a director of EPB, who sits on the upper boards of all 
GIEs. The whole system is overseen by the Management 
Evaluation Council (MEC), a 14 member committee 
consisting of the Deputy Prime Minister (chairman), 
supervising ministers, the head of KDI, and a few 
professors. As the highest performance evaluation 
organization, MEC is in charge of the deliberation and 
resolution of matters related to overall management of 
GIEs. Technical matters such as selection of performance
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criteria, its weights and actual evaluation, are handled 
by the Performance Evaluation Task Force consisting of 
part-time members; professors of management, economics, 
engineering, and certified public accountants.
The performance criteria are selected so as to 
measure the performance of a year against the trends in 
recent years as well as the degree of the achievements of 
pre-agreed management targets. Two kinds of criteria are 
used; quantitative criteria accounting for 70 percent of 
the final score and qualitative criteria accounting for 
30 percent. For each GIE, 10 to 15 quantitative and 
qualitative criteria are selected. Criteria and their 
weights are tailor-made for each GIE, although some 
efficiency criteria are common. Some criteria have two or 
more sub-criteria and they tend to be added or subtracted 
from year to year. In 1985, 'public profitability' 
featured as the primary criterion in 6 GIEs, 'private 
profitability' in 12 GIEs, and 'labour productivity' in 
the remaining 7 GIEs.19
Qualitative assessment is based on the GIE's 
performance in four major fields; medium and long range 
planning, R & D, quality of service and administrative 
improvements. An example of the criteria for Korea 
Telecommunications Authority is shown in table 5-3.
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Table 5-3 Performance Criteria and Weights for KTA, 1984
Criterion Weight(%)
A. Quantitative 60
1. Public Profitability 20
2. Technical Reliability & 
Quality of System
5
3. Number of Telephones Installed 5
4. Long Distance Service 5
5. Admnstrtive Expenses /Turnover 5
6. R & D / Turnover 5
7. Operating Assets / Turnover 5
8. Labour Cost / Turnover 5
9. Fnancial Structure Improvement 5
B. Qualitative 40
1. Long Range Planning 10
2. R & D 7
3. Service Improvement 10
4. Administrative Improvement 13
Total 100
Source: GIE Management Evaluation Council, Kvonavonq
p'vongqa p'vonram [Management Evaluation Manual], 1984.
At the end of a year GIEs submit a performance 
report, which is used to evaluate their performance on 
individual criteria and, thereby, overall performance, 
rated on a five-point scale; A=outstanding, B=excellent, 
C=good, D=fair and E=poor. A bonus ranging from 1 month's 
salary for an 'E' rating to 3 months' salary for an 'A' 
rating is paid to employees of the GIE. Previously, all 
GIEs paid an automatic bonus of 6 months salary to all
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employees. Now, 3 months salary is paid automatically 
while the rest is linked to the evaluation result. A GIE 
that scored an 'A' rating will get the same amount of 
bonus under the new scheme that all GIEs got 
automatically in the past.
4. Assessment of the Reform
Given the short experience the question of how far 
the reform measures have actually increased the economy, 
efficiency and effectiveness of GIEs cannot yet be 
answered. A rough indication of positive and negative 
contributions, however, can be mentioned.
A. Positive Contributions
Firstly, the operating profits have been continuously 
improving. The GIE total operating profit increased about 
65 percent from 1983 to 1986. GIE managers have become 
more cost-conscious and efficiency-oriented than before. 
The cost-saving effort is especially apparent in 
inventory management. An unnecessarily large stock of 
inventory is discouraged by the evaluation criteria.20
Secondly, the ratio of cost of sales to net sales has 
been decreasing steadily. Table 5-4 and Figure 5-1 show 
GIEs' average ratio reduced from the 1980-82 period to 
the 1984-86 period by 5.5 percent, while that of their
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private counterparts, whose shares are traded in the 
Korea Stock Exchange, increased by 2.3 percent.
Table 5-4 Ratio of Cost of Sales to Net Sales
GIEs Private Firms
1980 74.2 84.3
1981 75.2 85.3
1982 78.4 86.5
1983 76.2 86.7
1984 72.2 87.4
1985 70.5 87.7
1986 68.4 87.9
80-82 Average(A) 75.9 85.4
84-86 Average(B) 70.4 87.7
B - A - 5.5 2.3
Source: D.H. Song, Han/auk ui kongqiop kwanri chonach'aek 
[Public Enterprise Management Policy in Korea] (Seoul: 
Korea Development Institute, 1989) P.163.
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Figure 5-1 Comparison of Cost to Sales Ratio
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Thirdly, research and development activity has been 
enhanced. The ratio of R & D expenses over sales rose 
from 1.0 percent in 1984 to 1.2 percent in 1985, and R & 
D personnel among all employees increased from 2.1 
percent in 1984 to 3.9 percent in 1985. The supervision 
of R & D activities also improved, compared to the 
laissez-faire style typical in the past.21
Fourthly, as the interference from corresponding 
ministries on day-to-day management has decreased, GIEs' 
organizational management seems to be slowly improving. 
The greater flexibility in budgeting, contracting and 
personnel management encourages them to set new standards 
and rules appropriate for their needs. Long-term and 
short-term planning are also established and reviewed. A 
few GIEs carried out long-term planning even before the
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reform, but now all GIEs operate with long-term and 
short-term plans.
B. Negative Contributions
The reform measures have made a considerable impact. 
At first GIE managers tended not to treat them seriously 
and regarded the evaluation procedures as simply one more 
paper exercise. This attitude changed with the 
publication of results and differentiated bonuses ranging 
from one to three months' salary were awarded based on 
these results. From the point of view of the senior 
executives, the results received widespread attention 
from the press, politicians and senior government 
officials. But there seems to be considerable bureaucracy 
to be overcome. The MEC reports lamented the continuing 
GIE managements' tendency to rely on the government 
rather than doing business on their own initiative, while 
some government ministries still ask for detailed reports 
on GIE's day-to-day management.22
The functioning of the two-tier board system, 
however, is far from satisfactory. In many cases, the 
members of the upper board lack professional expertise 
and make little contribution to decision-making. Although 
resolutions should be adopted by a majority vote of all 
members,23 non-civil servant members seem to be easily 
overpowered by the representatives of the government ministry.
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On the Performance Evaluation System. 'Performance' 
is a very broad and vague concept: it has various
meanings for different audiences in different contexts. 
For example, the treasury tends to focus on financial 
performance whereas Parliament may be more interested in 
the effectiveness of policy, while consumers are anxious 
about the quality of service delivery. This adds to the 
difficulties of designing performance criteria because 
the same set of criteria may need to be used to answer 
questions about all the different dimensions of 
performance. Generally, performance criteria should be 
relevant to the needs and objectives of the organization; 
in other words they should measure aspects of performance 
that are central to the efficient and effective delivery 
of quality services. They should not be susceptible to 
manipulation by the person or unit to be assessed. 
Performance criteria should be reliable and need to be, 
as far as possible, unambiguous.24
Concerning the Korean evaluation system, however, a 
few difficulties can be cited. Firstly, targets are 
presently set without a detailed review by the task force 
of the basic objectives and long-term strategy of each 
GIE. The system checks the quality of strategic planning 
but not the content of the resulting plans. Without the 
framework of a long-term strategy it is hard to tell 
which criteria are really important and whether more of
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a criterion is better than less of it in the forthcoming 
year.25
Secondly, as many of the quantitative criteria values 
are determined by projecting past trends, managers will 
realize that abnormally high achievement in one year will 
raise targets for future years. Therefore, it is 
legitimate to worry that they will spend windfall gains 
on unnecessary items such as administration or 
employment.26
Thirdly, the wide fluctuation in the ranking of GIEs 
from year to year is largely the result of the very 
narrow spread in scores.
Table 5-5 Number of GIEs by Evaluated Grades________
Scores '84 ■N 00 VI
VO00 '87 '88
A 95-100 - - 12 12 9
B 90-94 18 15 12 11 13
C 85-89 5 9 1 1 2
D 80-84 2 1 - - -
E 75-79 - - - - -
Total 25 25 25 24 24
Source: GIE Management Evaluation Council, Chonabu t'uia 
kicrwan kvongvong siliok p'vongga pogoso [GIE Management 
Evaluation Report], 1984-1988.
For example, the Korea Electric Power Corporation 
slid from first to 13th place and the Korea Labour 
Welfare Corporation rose from 24th to 3rd place in 1984.
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A GIE which ranked 20th could have moved up to 7th place 
if its overall score had increased by only 2.0 points. As 
a consequence most GIEs get an overall rating of 'A' or 
'B' (Table 5-5) . Managers, ministers, and the media 
probably attach too much significance to ranks than they 
should. GIE employees are under considerable pressure to 
improve their scores by small fractions and, in some 
cases, succeeded in getting better marks by cheating at 
performance-related data.27
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CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The PE has a long tradition in Korea. Its relative 
importance in the economy dates back to the Japanese 
colonial period. Japan used PEs in the peninsula as an 
effective means for her economic and military aims and 
the sector accounted for about half of the colonial 
government revenues.
After years of political and social unrest since her 
independence, Korea gained stability and embarked upon a 
period of rapid industrialization in the early 1960s. The 
remarkable economic growth achieved since then cannot be 
explained by a liberal economic interpretation based on 
market-oriented private enterprise. This is particularly 
true during the two critical decades of the 1960s and 
1970s in which Korea transformed its predominantly 
agricultural economy towards an export-oriented 
manufacturing economy. The government, as the guide and 
coordinator, has shown itself to be both willing and 
capable of assuming important enterprise functions in its 
pursuit of economic development. Being a leading sector, 
PEs played an important role in Korea's rapid economic 
growth during this period. They grew significantly more 
rapidly than the economy as a whole. The dominant role of
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the public sector had evolved through Korea's long 
history, where a strong sense of racial homogeneity and 
the influence of neo-Confucianism can be noted as 
important socio-cultural factors.
Under the name of guided capitalism, national 
planning and PE were intensively utilized by the Park 
Government in achieving rapid economic growth. The 
government adopted planning for five-year periods as a 
tool for ensuring orderly growth. While PEs played a 
critical role as providers of industrial base and inputs 
for the manufacturing sector by heavily engaging in such 
key industries as infrastructure, energy, and raw 
materials, thus possible bottlenecks for 
industrialization could be eliminated. PEs typically were 
found in the heavy-chemical industries, as pioneers and 
means of promoting industrialization where capital and 
technology barriers to entry were very high. In addition, 
PEs were key players in the financial sector. By engaging 
in credit rationing in accordance with the government's 
industrial policy, financial PEs gave the government a 
powerful means of control over the private sector.
As the economy grew in size and complexity the 
government could no longer command it efficiently, and it 
is generally believed that Korean PEs are less cost 
efficient than their private counterparts. This belief 
became dominant in the early 1980s and brought an
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unprecedented reform in the direction of Government- 
Invested Enterprises, the core group of the PE sector, as 
part of the economic liberalization measures in 1984. 
Consequently the budget, appointment and procurement 
processes which had been subject to government's detailed 
scrutiny have been put under the responsibility of 
management and instead a unique performance evaluation 
system has been introduced.
The question of how far the reform measures have 
actually increased the performance of GIEs cannot yet be 
fully answered. Obviously there is plenty of room for 
improvement in some areas, i.e., the functioning of the 
two-tier board system, and the setting of targets and 
evaluation criteria for individual PE's. Also there are 
some undesirable side-effects like excessive competition 
among GIEs and bureaucratic inertia. Nonetheless, the 
preliminary data suggest a handsome improvement in the 
management performance in terms of production cost, 
operating profits, and research and development 
activities.
APPENDIX A: THE KOREAN PUBLIC ENTERPRISE SECTOR, 1986
Type of Public 
Enterprise
Characteristics Number of 
PEs (1987)
Employment
(thousand)
Turnover (Won, 
thous million)
Assets (Won, 
thous million)
Government
Enterprises
Government 
department type
4 73 2,683 9,507
Government-
Invested
Enterprises
Government share: 
at least 50 
percent
26 160 10,098 55,970
Subsidiary 
Companies of 
GIEs
68 75 5,825 8,022
Other
Government-
Backed
Enterprises
Government share: 
less than 50 
percent
6 31 3,954 27,931
Local Public 
Enterprises
119 25 465 5,354
Total 223 364 23,025 106,784
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APPENDIX B: GOVERNMENT-INVESTED ENTERPRISES, 1988
Employ­
ment
Turnovr
(Won,
thous
mill)
Korea Development Bank 1,990 722.7
Small & Medium Industry Bank 8,406 266.9
Citizens National Bank 11,799 336.4
Korea Housing Bank 8,382 264.6
Korea Securities Printing & 
Minting Corp
2,748 62.8
Korea Electric Power Corp 25,999 2,080.2
Daihan Coal Corp 14,526 109.8
Korea Mining Promotion Corp 480 8.5
Korea Petroleum Development Co 446 13.2
Korea Gas Corp 720 206.2
Korea National Housing Corp 2,594 345.1
Korea Highway Corp 2,896 117.2
Korea Water Resources Corp 1,901 261.3
Korea Land Development Corp 1,398 166.1
Agricltrl Prodcts Marketng Corp 640 23.3
Agriculture Development Corp 1,881 81.8
Korea Trade Promotion Corp 575 16.6
Korea General Chemical Corp 46 18.7
Korea Overseas Development Corp 197 1.3
Korea Labour Welfare Corp 1,570 15.1
Kukchong Textbook Company 487 11.6
Korea National Tourism Corp 758 42.1
Korea Tlcommunication Authority 53,036 1,271.7
Korea Broadcasting System 5,437 144.2
Korea Monopoly Corp 11,190 1,003.6
Total (25) 160,097 7,591.0
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